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THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF RELIGION

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To attempt in these days a definition of religion may seem like taking a wanton risk of intellectual confusion. Even a rough classification of religions is difficult. The mass of data is so vast, the varieties of religion so manifold, that no sooner has a scheme of classification established itself than it begins to sag under the weight of material thrown upon it. The old schemes which hinged on a fixed distinction between the religion of the Bible and all religions outside the pale of Biblical revelation, succeeded by dint of excluding a large part of the phenomena. But, as things are with us, no classification is better than a working hypothesis into which, as a constituent element, enters the knowledge of its own mortality.

If classification is difficult, definition would seem to be perilous. Its chances of success turn largely on its narrowness. And by narrowness it pleads guilty to a mishandling of the facts involved, sacrificing thoroughness to clearness. The student of religion, in case he has a grudge to fatten, might almost say, "Oh that mine enemy would publish a definition!"

Yet the mass of data which render definition perilous also make it necessary. The definition may be imperfect; still, it is a help to clearer thinking. And every attempt at definition presupposes a straight question brought to bear, with varying degrees of precision, on the phenomena which at the same moment invite and resist analysis.

In our day the need of definition is imperious. A rapidly

increasing body of facts, gathered from the four corners of the world, is being pressed on our attention. If one has any real speculative interest in religion as a factor in the world's life, and if he desires to be an intelligent reader, then, no matter how vehemently he may disclaim any attempt at a science of religion, he must have a provisional definition to give direction to his reading. Otherwise, he will surely fall a victim to a series of impressions, more or less vivid, but lacking continuity.

Apart from the need personal to us as intelligent readers is the larger need of our generation. The definitions which we have inherited sprang from times of transition and crisis. One set belongs to the period that witnessed the establishment of Christianity in the Mediterranean world. The local, ancestral religions had broken down and defaulted. The times demanded a universal religion. Greek philosophy compelled earnest men to reflect on the nature of religion as a whole, and the result was a set of definitions.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries similar causes have produced similar results, though they are on a much larger scale. Dogma has lost its grip on reason. Authority has let slip its hold on the will. The religious consciousness has broken away from its own past. The rise of the modern state and the exploration of the universe have put forward objects of interest which lay claim to the full attention of earnest people. At the same time all parts of the earth have come into touch with one another, and, since the lines of distinction between the religion of the Bible and all other religions are no longer clear and convincing, the great debate of the world's religions has for the first time in history honestly begun. Now if one is to enter that debate with any hope of a sincere and effective give-and-take, he must have a working definition. Define, then, the student must,—even though, as under a certain law in ancient Athens, he makes the attempt with a rope round his neck.

The title chosen for this paper is of some significance, at least for the writer. Should it read the "essence" or the "nature" of religion? In strict logic, there is no distinction between the terms. But logic and usage have different standards. Books like Harnack's *Essence of Christianity* suggest that the term "essence"

is more objective than "nature," and that it has, moreover, a stronger tendency to raise questions regarding the metaphysical or historical contents of this or that religious view of the universe. The word "nature," on the other hand, is more subjective, and has a stronger tendency towards questions such as: How does the religious element within consciousness differ from the other elements which enter into it? how is the religious element related to the other elements? and what is the taste it leaves in the mouth? So the best working title is "The Nature and Definition of Religion."

In searching for a definition, our method is prescribed to us by the nature of the subject. Not in the experience of the individual but in the experience of the race are we to conduct our investigation. For in no field is Cicero's "*unus homo nullus homo*" quite so plain as in the fields of religion. We must, therefore, seek our end in the history of religion; and the history must be taken in its totality. Fetichism belongs to it no less than the highest form of the Christian consciousness. No other method is safe. More than one of the definitions which have been put forward, while springing from the depths of an individual need or even from the need of a generation of men, have missed the mark by reason of the restricted area of feeling and tendency which they include. A definition inspired by the needs of a particular age or a particular circle, however vital and impassioned it may be, is in danger of forgetting a great deal that needs to be remembered. The excluding power of passion is in proportion to its intensity.

The danger is at its height in the case of the modern student, deeply self-conscious, more or less widely detached from some things which the man who lived deep in antiquity would have set down as vitally important. Just once in history has an individual appeared who acted as though he were the "author of himself," knowing "no other kin"; and that was in the eighteenth century. It is true that the eighteenth-century individual no longer has credit. Indeed, so far as appearances go, he is dead and buried. But a period so extraordinary is deeply symptomatic, leaving behind it influences that strongly mould thought long after its public credit has vanished.

We may safely venture to say that there are three questions, and three alone, that have vitally interested all sorts and conditions of men from the beginning of historic time. These are the food question, the sex question, and the religious question. Other things, such as culture, philosophy, science, and art, have been the specialties of one or another class of men, of this or that period of history, of such and such parts of the earth. But these three questions have touched the race always and everywhere, and touched it to the quick.

Therefore the contemporary individual is in danger of overweighting certain elements in his own consciousness, while underweighting elements which at another time and place may be of prime importance. "More water floweth by the mill than wots the miller of." The student must ally himself closely to the ancients. For it is evident that universal history believes in the division of labor on a vast scale. Antiquity did the pioneer's work that has made history possible. The State was founded; civilization was achieved. And the work done by religion in this field is essential to a clear insight into the nature of religion as an historical force. The result is that antiquity, where religion operated under conditions extremely unlike the specializing conditions of our time, is most important in any large consideration of our subject. It is a well-known law in psychological study that close attention to the phenomena of one's own inner consciousness is apt to dissipate the phenomena under investigation. One must catch himself off guard, peep through the keyhole at himself, above all must see himself writ large in society and history, in order to know to the fullest extent the fact or tendency in question. Even so is it in the field of religion. The modern must guard himself against the risk of excluding from consideration things which may not be apprehended by the reflective individual as needful and yet to the nation and the race have primary worth and supreme significance.

Before we study the history of religion at large, it seems advisable to review briefly both the definitions which we have inherited and the ones now current. The review may prepare us for deeper insight into history.

The first group of definitions was published in the Roman

empire, being in connection with the destruction of the old religion and the spread and triumph of the new. Speaking roughly, two causes worked together in the process of destruction. The first was the widening polity of the ancient world. Many nations were dragged inside one pale. Local religions, incompetent to handle the widening and deepening relationships of humanity, fell into discredit. The enlargement of social obligations called for a larger conception of life and of its unseen foundations. The second cause was philosophical criticism upon inherited customs and convictions. But philosophy itself was eventually sucked into a stream of tendency which ended by making necessary a view of things flushed with the passion and primary feeling that philosophy by itself could not supply.

First in order of time is the view of Lucretius, which so deeply influenced later thought, and which is compactly expressed in the often-quoted words of Petronius (Fragm. xxvii, 1 B), "*Primus in orbe timor fecit deos.*" One striking illustration of its influence is found in Virgil's lines (Georg. ii, 490 ff.):

*Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.*

Lucretius built his conception of religion on Epicurus. In its first meaning it applies mainly to the individual, and it was in that sense that Lucretius designed it. The object of philosophy is deliverance from the fears and terrors which beset and besiege the soul of the uncultivated man, driving him into the open arms of superstition. But, as Hobbes showed long ago and as Professor Palmer has recently suggested (in *The Field of Ethics*), Lucretius' conception has a wider meaning than he was clearly aware of. Beyond all question there is a profound truth in it. A quotation from Hume, discussing the origin of religion, is in point:

We hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want, which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes*, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and, while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by our anxious expectation

of events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire dependence.

In antiquity, before philosophy and science had shaped the conception of the universe as an organism of law, religion was the sole sanctuary from the fears that besiege consciousness on every side. Religion, and religion alone, could overcome the terrors of the unknown. At this point the religious history of Babylonia is profoundly significant. Here was shaped that system of augury which enabled the ancient world to find helpful meaning in the happenings of life. Here, too, on a higher plane than augury, was elaborated and published that body of knowledge and fancy which we call primitive astronomy or astrology, whose aim was to give men foresight of the future, thus robbing it of its power to terrorize consciousness. In one sense or another Lucretius' idea is deeply true. Ancient religion is inseparable from the beginnings of civilization, and not merely from its beginnings but from some of its most considerable achievements. From one point of view civilization is a system of insurance on a vast scale. And the function of religion, as an organic part of antiquity, was to insure men against the perils and dread of the unknown. Lucretius himself stood in a contemptuous attitude toward religion. He was playing for his own hand, seeking the individual's peace of mind. He did not undertake to explain the moral foundations of states and the ultimate grounds of political obligation. But his words go deeper and wider than his intention. Not only was it true in the beginnings of the religious consciousness that fear largely controlled and shaped the course of religious feeling. It is still true. The relation between the known and the unknown tracts of being and meaning is the ultimate spring of abiding religion.

Yet the definition, when put forward as final and exclusive, is seen to be impossible. A larger experience, a widening conscious relation with the nature of things, discloses the fact that in the course of history fear ceases to be the prime motive of religious action and becomes the medium, or a part of the medium, through which the ultimate reality makes itself known to men.

Next in order of time is Cicero's definition (*De natura deorum*,

ii, 28): "Religion (*relegere*) is the art of collecting the deeper meanings out of multitudinous religious customs." The words themselves are on the surface of the subject. But in fairness to Cicero we must put them in the context of his life. He was an eclectic, and his eclecticism suggested an etymology which is practically impossible. But a man's etymologies are not the measure of his truths. Behind Cicero's eclecticism stood philosophical monotheism with its inspiring ideals of self-knowledge and of the unity and coherence of all knowledge in the idea of God. Thus taken, in its suggestion rather than in its mistaken etymological sense, the definition contains an element of value. Like the view of Lucretius, the suggestion goes deeper than the words, and points toward the Aristotelian and Kantian doctrine of the saving unity of thought in its relation to the unity of God. It deserves more consideration than recent students have condescended to give it. But a glance at the history of religion is enough to cashier it, if it attempts to become anything more than a constituent element within a larger total.

Last in order of time, but most significant of all the ancient definitions, is the one given by Lactantius (*Inst.* iv, 28). Criticising Cicero's definition he says: "The name of religion is derived from the bond (*religare*) of piety, because God has *tied* man to himself and *bound* him by piety, for we must serve him as a master, and be obedient to him as a father." Lactantius' etymology is probably correct. But etymological correctness is a small part of the value in the definition, which goes very deep indeed into the nature of religion both in the ancient and the modern worlds. Let the student read Plutarch's lives of Lycurgus and Numa, Fustel de Coulanges' *Ancient City*, and Wissowa's *Religion und Cultus der Römer*. Let him in connection therewith study the use of the Old Testament canon, considering it under the aspect of law. He shall then see how near Lactantius comes to the deepest meaning of religion in antiquity. Now, as has been said, the modern student must take antiquity's teaching deeply to heart. Thanks to our distinction between church and state and the resultant division of labor, we are poorly equipped for insight into the part played by religion in founding and developing the state. It is not until one has reflected on the grounds

of civic obligation, and has carried that question into its contemporary position inside the "social question," that he is in a condition to pass judgment on the definition of Lactantius. And it is a serious criticism on the moderns that they have so lightly passed it by. For example, Hagenbach (*Theologische Encyclopädie*, § 12) carelessly dismisses it with two lines of fine print.

The explanation of this cursory treatment is found in the personal equation of the moderns. Along with the distinction between church and state go tendencies of culture which mark off a certain tract of experience as the only territory over which religious judgments run, while outside lies a widening tract within which religion consciously lays its hand on its mouth. Authoritative in one clearly defined field, in an adjacent field it lacks even the right of speech.

Each of the definitions thus far considered is suggestive. Two of them are extremely valuable. And all three lie close to that period in the history of the race wherein religion has done, so far, its greatest work. We moderns should not take ourselves too seriously. Particularly should we be on our guard against contemporaneity. It may be that ahead of us lies a constructive period in religion for which the critical work of our time is a preliminary. We must have a care lest the distinctions of function which we have achieved at so great a cost, and which are proportionately dear to us, shall lead us to separate things which prove to be more deeply related the more clearly they are distinguished.

We now turn to a set of definitions having a very different color. To prepare ourselves to understand them, we must take careful account of the conditions under which they have taken shape. First, then, let us go back to the eighteenth century, out of which we have been digged. Something quite foreign to antiquity now appears. In the recoil from the dogma of infallibility in all its power, the rejection of religion is put on higher grounds than those on which the ancient skeptics stood. It is in the interest of the state, in the interest of a higher moral law, in order to draw attention away from the world beyond and to fix it on the world of citizenship, that religious authority is so passionately rejected. As a consequence, religion is subjected to

a far more persistent and searching examination than it has ever received before.

Secondly, the individual and his rights become the all-absorbing theme. In antiquity the individual hardly existed. Even in Greece philosophy was largely the affair of a circle or a school, a kind of philosophic family. But in the modern period the individual in full armor leaps into the lists. Religion, if he concerns himself with it at all, is a highly personal affair. Now with the great gains accruing from this position both to vital religion and social morality we are not here concerned. It is the results of the position and mental action of this well-nigh elaborately self-conscious individual, when he sets himself to defining religion, that concern us. And it is easily seen that the situation is almost antipodal to that of antiquity.

Thirdly, science not only takes on a form which throws the achievements of the ancients into the shade, but—what is much more to our purpose—science becomes popular, profoundly affecting the common consciousness. This democratic aspect of science finds almost no analogy in the Mediterranean world, where science was the prerogative of a very small circle, having no popular spread worth speaking of.

Fourthly, in connection with science stands the immensely important idea of evolution, in so far as it bears on ethics and upon systems of idealism. Darwin, in his study of earth-worms, says that mental inability to appreciate the prodigious effects of small causes persistently working over a wide tract of time is the greatest obstacle in the way of scientific advancement. We may apply his thought to the study of idealism in its history and in its methods. Thanks to the idea of evolution, the idealizing man can keep his footing on the earth under a strain that would either have broken down his idealizing kinsman in antiquity (debasement him into a worldling) or else, in the fear of moral bankruptcy, have driven him into open and confessed religion. The modern idealist, on the contrary, filled with his great conception of orderly progress and content with small gains slowly but steadily accumulating, is less apt to fall into the conscious need of religion.

Finally, the modern nation has come on the field. In antiquity

church and state were identified. For many centuries after the break-down of ancient culture and law the church was supreme over the state. Now the state is supreme. And however great may be the amount of actual and potential religion within the state, yet there is here in view a wide field of idealizing activities more or less distinct, even if not separated, from the consciously and deliberately religious method for insuring the ideal interests of society.

The upshot of all the distinctively modern conditions is that religion can be held aloof from the nobler and more earnest spirits to a degree impossible in the ancient world. And along with this is given the possibility both of a far more restricted area of feeling for religion to cover and of a more searching analysis of the individual's conscious relation to it.

The first of the modern definitions in the order of time is that of Kant. It stands in connection with his position in the history of philosophy. His function therein was to grasp clearly the scientific conception of the universe on the one hand, and on the other to assert the principle of moral freedom. One can understand him only by beginning with Thales and coming up to him through Greek philosophy and the history of Christianity. When Western philosophy began its career it had no clear conception of consciousness. Mind and nature were fused. Slowly the idea of inanimate nature and a self-conscious human reason were distinguished. But the distinction came very slowly. The Stoics plainly show that, in spite of Plato and Aristotle, Mind had great difficulty in distinguishing itself from Nature. The turn of the road was made by Neoplatonism and Christianity. Here the modern idea of self-consciousness first clearly appears. But at the same time the scientific conception of the universe shaped by Alexandrian thought is practically submerged by the religious and poetical imagination, so that the full consequences of the doctrine of self-consciousness could not manifest themselves. But in Kant the two things come into direct collision. In this respect he is a deeply representative modern. The conception of self-consciousness in its originating and initiating capacity is developed with revolutionary decision and completeness. But it is no part of a mystical view of the universe. On the contrary,

the scientific view of nature is entertained in all its strength. Out of the shock and collision of these two elements comes Kant's idea of religion.

The right of religion to exist and to thrive in a world of thinking men can be made good only within the precincts of the practical reason. That is to say, the man who is a scientist with all his mental being while with all his moral and social being he believes in freedom—that is, man's ability to become what he longs to be—must, in order to keep his footing, get help from a religious view of the unseen universe, its resources and its tendencies. Pure reason cannot save him from the death-grip of cosmic necessity. The philosopher and the charcoal-burner must tread the same path. The practical reason, which we may describe in technical language as man's compelling need to take high views of his capacity and destiny and to insist upon his right to such views, whatever may be the gainsaying evidence of his senses and of nature—the practical reason takes the place of the pure reason. But the practical reason cannot continue to exist and grow strong without religion. And the essence of religion is an act of faith, or creative self-assertion, in which the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality are given to man with authoritative conviction, and through which his destiny as a moral being who is in search of the inseparable goods of virtue and happiness is made certain and secure. Religion is identical with high and efficient morality.

It is for this reason that the Kantian definition has been most widely criticised. Religion cannot be identified with morality. The poet has quite as much to say about the matter in hand as has the moralist. The artist has quite as much authority as the philosopher. The man of religion, borne on a tide of fresh and joyous emotion, refuses to shut himself up inside Kant's definition. But the bulk of criticism on Kant has gone wide of the mark. Kant's definition, like those of Lucretius and Cicero, should be taken in its drift and tendency, not confined to its literal statement and scope. Take it as meaning that religion is the means whereby man triumphantly asserts, in the face of nature, his high calling and large future, and it is profoundly true. Not only does our own experience prove it. It is proved

also by the entire history of religion. The real flaw in Kant's definition lies deeper. His unit of thought and feeling is the eighteenth-century individual. The social relations of thought hang loose upon him. The result is that his connection with the vast bulk of religious feeling that has put itself on record is vague and uncertain.

Schleiermacher is quite as typical in the religious field as is Kant in the field of philosophy. In him two elements blend. In part he is a deeply metaphysical head. In part—and here he differs from Kant—he is a man of intense and vital religious emotion. Religion with Kant is an auxiliary to morality. With Schleiermacher it is an end in itself. The pith of religion is the inrush and uprush of feeling which flushes consciousness with an eager and joyous sense of solidarity with the unseen world. In this view Schleiermacher discloses his connection with the romanticism which on the one hand revolted against the tyranny of eighteenth-century intelligibility and common sense, and on the other protested with equal vehemence against the conventional. Romantic feeling was tortured by the contrast between the world one lives in and the world one longs for. The passion for the infinite, cabined and confined within stale but invincible customs—that is the theme of romantic literature. Schleiermacher shared deeply in the movement. It gave force and edge to his temperamental capacity for emotional self-surrender to the mystery of things. At the same time he takes from Kant the depreciatory estimate of the competence of reason. Defining religion in terms of pure feeling and in clear distinction from Kant's moralizing definition on one side and from the traditional credal view on the other, he shaped that conception which has precipitated all modern tendencies towards definition and with which every student must settle his account.

“Religion is the feeling of absolute dependence upon the First Cause of life.” Two elements in the statement should be noted. First, religion is neither knowledge nor action, but feeling. Knowledge and action inevitably follow, but, abstraction being necessary for clearness, they are seen to be distinct from its essence. Historically, they are always in connection with it. Logically, they may be and must be distinguished, though not sepa-

rated. Secondly, religious feeling differs from other forms of feeling by its absoluteness. It is closely akin to aesthetic emotion and, in truth, to all those forms of primary emotion, such as patriotism, which carry a man outside himself and enable him joyously to identify himself with an order of things stretching far beyond his largest thought and purpose. But all other forms of primary emotion leave a man standing in his world with a stronger or weaker sense of freedom. Religious feeling, on the contrary, throws men at the feet of the Almighty. The consciousness of freedom is no constituent part of it. Its distinguishing quality is the sense of absolute dependence. And when it is analyzed and a theological system results, the one aim of dogmatics is to make manifest to reason God's part in the making of men.

This definition lies at the very heart of religion. That is beyond question. In contrast with Kant, Schleiermacher rightly conceives religion as the deepest source of primary and plenary emotion. It is the soul's vitalizing contact with an ultimate reality too vast for conscious thought to grasp or conscious purpose to put into specific actions. And, in opposition to the credal and intellectualistic view of faith, it rightly shifts the centre of gravity to first-hand experience. Yet the definition has some serious faults. For one thing, the term "feeling" has too many entangling alliances to be largely usable. Schleiermacher takes pains to show that knowing and doing are historically inseparable from feeling. But he does not succeed. The world of feeling is related to the world of meaning and action somewhat as, in the romantic view of things, the sense of the infinite relates itself to the actual constitution of society. The term "feeling" inevitably leads to misunderstanding and misstatement. Schleiermacher, however, insists on the term, and by his insistence lays bare a deeper flaw in his view. When he comes to systematic theology, God in his essence draws apart from God in his attributes. In other words, the essential being of God is loosely, not organically, related to the universe. The core of deity shrinks from history. Schleiermacher's idea of God is substantially one with that of the mystics from Plotinus to Boehme.

A further consequence is that the individual saint is loosely related to the spiritual community within which he has his being. This comes out in the exposition of the difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. In the former, it is affirmed, the individual's relationship to the church is mediated through his relationship to Christ, while in the latter his relationship to Christ is mediated through his relationship to the church. Now there is, of course, a considerable element of truth in the statement. But, taken as a final statement, this does not hold water. Put it alongside of the New Testament, that is, test it by the religious experience of the men who founded the Christian community, and its tendency is plainly seen. It is the reflection of an individual who has never done any creative social work of any kind. Brandes says with point (*Main Currents*, iii, p. 256): "Schleiermacher . . . is of opinion that the only hope for religion lies in surrendering all the outworks and leading it back to the inmost stronghold, the purely personal feeling of the individual." We are still within the eighteenth century. We are not wholly rid of Robinson Crusoe. Now, as a matter of fact, the religious individual cannot deeply know or master himself save in the fellowship of his peers. Relationship is as deep in him as his nature. And the God of the community reveals himself within and through the community, as being of like nature. Relationship is as deep in God as the divine being. Therefore Schleiermacher's definition, indispensable as it is to the clearing of our heads, is faulty. And its faults have a common root, a lack of intimacy between the soul and the historical process within which its fortune is made or lost.

The most widely current definition of our time is the result of the Ritschelian movement. Once more the conditions should be carefully noted. Philosophy in Germany has fallen from her high estate. Trendelenburg said jestingly, but with biting truth, that after Hegelianism had run its course, Germany resembled a man who had gone on a prolonged spree, and, waking up with a splitting headache, resolved to drink no more. This condition of philosophical thought is even more significant than the state of things to which Kant applied Ovid's lines on Hecuba in the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique*:

*Modo maxima rerum,
Tot generis natisque potens, . . . nunc trahor exul, inops.*

For now a rival interest has taken possession of consciousness. Science has become dominant. Metaphysical thought is quite out of fashion. So Kant's antithesis between natural necessity and moral freedom is more in place than in his own time. Tennyson's lines,

Are God and nature then at strife,
That nature lends such evil dreams?

have given to the modern situation enduring expression. Strauss, in the Introduction to his *Glaubenslehre*, described another aspect of the situation when he said that the controversy between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism had become a relatively unimportant thing, the supreme issue lying between the Christian view of life and science.

In vital connection with Ritschl's work stand the beginnings of that great movement which resulted in a united and triumphant Germany. Positive and practical things began to take hold of Teutonic consciousness with convincing power. Thanks to the political and the scientific cause together, the academic world of Kant and Hegel passed away. Furthermore, high philosophy passed out of Hegelianism into socialism. Feuerbach is a typical figure. Strauss travelled the same road. Socialism began the career which has ended in our own day in its practically supplanting the established Protestant faith in Germany. The total result is that idealizing thought is more and more driven out of metaphysics. The pride of philosophy is completely humbled. Abandoning Hegel's ground, she returns to the position of Kant's second Preface. If idealism is to be saved, it must be by another method than that of high speculation. Only through the practical, or moral, reason can the cause of idealism be secured.

A very interesting illustration is found in the new base for the doctrine of freedom. Kant had grounded it in thought, by means of the distinction between the empirically and the transcendently real. But Ritschl frankly abandons that ground. The sole sanction, he thinks, of the individual's freedom is the freedom of society, the enduring possibility of betterment. We build the

stronghold of our faith in the individual's freedom in the space lying between society as it is and society as it is to be (*Science and Metaphysics*, part 2, chap. 3). Whatever one may think about the permanent value of this position, there can be no doubt regarding its contemporary significance. The social ideal controls all things, even metaphysics.

Under these conditions Ritschelianism, harking back to Kant in philosophy and to Luther in religion, and staking everything on the possibility of freeing the religious consciousness from the interference and intrusion of metaphysics, forms its definition. From Schleiermacher it takes the conception of religion as that form of feeling which entirely transcends finite conditions; but it avoids his left-handed marriage with mysticism. Religion is a working conviction, supreme amongst the judgments of worth. By means of it man secures his position in the universe, maintains his freedom against the perilous siege of natural necessity, and insures his self-respect. Schleiermacher made much of the Biblical idea of the kingdom of God. Owing, however, to the other elements in his system, he could not do it full justice. In Ritschelianism it becomes the centre of a system. Religion is the form of feeling which secures a man in his conviction that human life as a whole can be moralized.

In a small way, our study of definitions proves the truth of the saying that the history of the world is the world's judgment-seat. For the last definition reached is the most comprehensive. It retains what is valuable in Kant's position without losing the vitalizing sense of personal religion which distinguishes Schleiermacher. Beyond question it comes from the very depths of personal and social need in our time. But its form of statement suffers from excessive contemporaneity. May not the essence of it be put in a way which shall smack less strongly of the philosophically trained modern?

There are other definitions more or less current in our day which are too highly specialized to detain us. For example, Max Müller defines religion as the sense of the Infinite. This will appeal to us in proportion to our poetical and philosophical culture. But it is too largely the birth of our own time to yield itself to a wide historical application. And our review of the inherited and

the modern definitions strengthens the belief that the hope of reaching a sound and comprehensive conception is bound up with a study of the religious consciousness when it is at work on a large scale. So alone can we keep clear of excessive emphasis on the mood of an individual or a generation. We must build our definition into the history of religion.

Marshall, in his *Principles of Economics* (vol. i, p. 1), says that "the two great forming agencies of the world have been the religious and the economic." The truth of his words is seen with great clearness in the founding of states. Civilization, understood in the deepest sense, is the power of co-operative labor—co-operation in terms of space, so that large masses of men are trained to work and to fight as a unit; co-operation in terms of time, the building of a continuous memory, so that an increasing purpose is apprehended and appropriated by successive generations. The problem of early civilization is in part the successful transition to artificial food-production on a large scale and to the means of defence whereby a settled agricultural population maintains itself against attack. And, in equal measure, the problem is to maintain friendly relations with the unseen forces and powers which beset human intelligence and purpose more and more insistently as consciousness deepens and the range of activity is increased. The economic and the religious agencies are, in the long run, inseparable. Working together, they founded and shaped ancient civilization.

We may take Chaldaea as a typical case and Babylon—one of the four cities that have most deeply affected the mind and the manners of men—as a typical path-making community. The cultus, or worship, is the life-blood of the state; under one form it manifests itself as primitive prayer, prayer being inseparable from magic. There are certain fixed forms of words which, when joined to certain symbolical actions, grasp and hold fast the invisible agencies of the world, and thus insure to human purpose a right of way through the unseen portions of the universe. Under another form the cultus manifests itself as sacrifice. The psychological basis of sacrifice is found in the fact that by means of it man brings his strongest power of attention to bear upon the unknown forces that beset him. This stands out plainly in

the prerogative cases of the ancient cultus, such as Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia, Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, Mesha's sacrifice of his eldest son, and Epimenides' sacrifice of two noble young Athenians in order to cleanse and absolve the conscience of Athens. When in dire need and under well-nigh fatal strain, man devoted his most precious possession to the invisible powers. His sacrifice is an act of piercing attention to the unseen world. And through the prodigious exercise of will a response to human need is wrung from the resources of that world.

Under another form the cultus manifests itself as the common feast. Robertson Smith has proved in a masterly way that this is profoundly characteristic of the higher forms of tribal communities. Hearne in his *Aryan Household*, Fustel de Coulanges in *The Ancient City*, and Maine in *Ancient Law* together prove that it perpetuated itself in many ways long after a number of tribal communities had merged into a real state. Through the common meal or festival and the joyous uprush of common feeling to which it gave rise, men were strengthened in their consciousness of collective power. At the same time their sense of solidarity with the unseen powers was proportionately deepened. Thus, to use a formula in favor with those ancient folk, they "quieted the heart." Out of this situation sprang that primitive conception of the covenant between God and man which is one of the fundamental ideas of the race and which asserts its influence clear through the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. And it was an unhappy chance in the history of words that gave us "Testament" instead of "Covenant" as the name for our Bible.

Finally, the cultus discloses its power by conferring insight into the unknown. The system of augury which draws out of omens of many kinds a convincing knowledge of impending things is in full evidence at this point. And in closest connection with it, though far higher in moral range and mental promise, is the astrology by means of which man enabled himself to read confidently the book of the future in the light of the "secret influence" of the stars.

Through all these causes in co-operation, hallowed by immemorial usage, beaten by rigid custom into an incongruous yet sacramental unity, man attained his first working hypothesis

regarding an authoritative disclosure of the ultimate force or will. And thus he solved for a time that most difficult of all problems, the problem of law.

From Babylon, regarded as a typical city, we may derive certain features or characteristics of religion when it is laboring on the most heroic of human tasks, the founding and grounding of society. Advanced civilization, with its highly developed specializations of function, conceals or slurs over some things which here lie in plain sight. To the student of the beginnings of civilization it is quite clear that religion is to be viewed as the supreme form of self-assertion on man's part. The underlying reason for the connection between the economic and the religious forces of history lies in the fact that they constitute the supreme form of the struggle for existence. As civilization advances and character deepens, the struggle is waged on higher levels. But always and everywhere it is one and the same battle. Through religion man asserts himself in the face and even in the teeth of adverse circumstances, asserts himself with self-convincing power, maintains his dignity and pride and so insures his efficiency.

The method through which this self-assertion and this self-insurance are wrought out is, on the social side, deepening common feeling. Religion here manifests itself as the final form of common consciousness. In our own time there are other forms of common feeling, such as fervid patriotism and social sympathy, which seem to put themselves forward as rivals of religious feeling. But a thorough analysis shows that a religious element is hidden within them, and that it is due to temporary conditions and causes that this implicitly religious equality of deep and wide common consciousness does not become explicit.

On the side of the cultus or system of public and private worship, the method is a symbolical and sacramental connection with the unseen world. The primitive sacrament takes on many forms. But in every one of them, just as plainly as in the most refined and spiritualized conception of the Lord's Supper, the object aimed at—and attained, if the sacrament be sacramentally apprehended—is the solidarity between the seen and the unseen parts of an indivisible universe.

It is a single indivisible world with which antiquity deals.

The familiar saying that there is no supernatural in Homer applies to the whole field of antiquity. There is no supernatural because there is no scientific conception of nature. Our terminology relating to the supernatural has grown out of the alliance between the Bible on the one hand and a philosophy and science on the other which in their origin and early stages of development came from a source wholly outside the Bible. Antiquity had an indivisible universe to deal with. There was no supernatural—but there was an over-world fully as real as the visible world. And with this over-world religion put man on terms of intimacy. The wider the view of life, the more largely was this over-world conceived, and the greater became the range and steadiness of motive. On the low level of fetichism human motive is narrow in its range. When states are founded, the range is vastly widened, and at the same time the personal and social will gain proportionately in steadiness. But the end of religion remains the same. It is man's final and fundamental act of self-assertion in terms of the unseen and unknown realities into which he peers with hope and dread. The religious method is social on the one side and on the other sacramental. The result in terms of emotion is the certainty of strengthening, saving connection with forces mightier than man. And sympathetic insight into these forces—practical confidence in their eventual workings—is the ultimate aim.

These characteristics of religion take on diverse forms when the religious consciousness advances to problems far removed from the bread-and-butter questions and the club-law of primitive social order. But the diversity of form does not alter the identity of purpose. The decisive change is effected when soul and body are clearly distinguished in thought, and when, later on, the soul succeeds in claiming for itself a kind of reality superior to the reality of the body. India takes the place of Babylon as the typical or prerogative case. Now the most significant fact in the religious history of India is that political relationship and political responsibility did not succeed in imposing themselves on the deepest religious consciousness as matters of primary religious obligation. The saintly soul, with a logic of consummate precision and beauty, thinks away, or volatilizes, the reality

of that order of things within which the state lives and moves and has its being. An intense and compelling "otherworldliness" becomes the order of the day.

This gives us another note of ancient religion. When civilization has gone so far that for a certain number of men the pressure of practical problems either ceases altogether or perceptibly lightens, and when, standing foot-loose towards many forms of obligation which held all men in the earlier days with an iron grip, these privileged men go deep into their own natures in search of some easement beneath "the heavy and the weary weight" of an "unintelligible world," they inevitably become "otherworldly." Their otherworldliness may take the form of the Buddhist nirvana or the heaven of the mediaeval saint. But the aim is one. All religions that have gone any considerable distance beyond the tribal polity and the tribal theology have pursued it. The real world is taken to be vastly larger than the world that is seen. And in this unseen yet real order of things the interests of the soul are invested.

Still, though the methods whereby the soul seeks its ends may differ widely from the methods of primitive religion, the result is the same—namely, successful self-assertion against the discounts and belittlings of unkindly circumstances and contemptuous death. Moreover, while methods differ, at bottom there is an identity in method. It consists in establishing a sympathetic relationship between the known and the unknown, between the facts of reality open to every-day experience and the reality outlying and inaccessible, so that the mind discovers an asylum where fear cannot touch it, and finds, in the heart of agitation, an abiding peace.

The religious experience of Israel, as recorded in the Old Testament, has a unique value, and for three reasons. First, because we have here a kind of religion that moves towards universalism not, as in India, by invalidating the historical life of the race, but by imposing on history a moral purpose and prescribing for it a moral end. Secondly, because the individual, while acquiring a deeper and deeper knowledge of himself and setting on the individual life an ever-increasing value, keeps himself in close contact with the common consciousness of his nation. Thirdly,

because the Old Testament, while on the surface it is a book of mediation and compromise and fuses the genius of primitive Semitic religion with the genius of Prophetism, has in its deepest being a logic of life which demands the Christian interpretation of history.

The prophet, building on the foundations common to the Semites, shaped a new form of idealism. His supreme good is in the most intimate connection with the destiny of his nation. The unity of God and the unity of Israel, the eternal being of God and the indestructibility of Israel, are for him correlative conceptions. He does not, as did Aristotle, put history aside as a badly conducted drama. The divine unity with him is not a matter to be apprehended only by severe and continuous thinking. History is viewed as a moral drama moving steadily towards a divine conclusion, and through its turns and issues the being and will of God are revealed. Still less does the prophet, like the Hindu idealist, cashier the political and social will in order to save his soul. The nation's existence and will has so tough a fibre, and he partakes of it so deeply, that his otherworldliness never becomes the otherworldliness of the saintly ascetic. On the contrary, it takes the form of the messianic hope, the impassioned and noble, though narrow, belief in the future of his people.

The prophet takes the primitive religion of the Semites and moralizes it, shifting the centre of gravity from levitical custom and sacrifice to the keeping of the heart. But to the aim of that religion he holds himself true. Taking the primitive conception of a covenant between God and man, he purifies it so that Israel is not thought of as part and parcel of nature, drifting with circumstance, but becomes God's free creation. God is exalted high above circumstances, above the entire frame of nature. And the divine resources are pledged to Israel's preservation. For primitive magic and primitive astronomy the prophet substitutes confidence in the moral character of God. The wizard, the soothsayer, the astrologer, shall have no part in his polity. In their stead comes a deep self-consciousness, within which the unknown powers and forces of nature reveal themselves as the personal will of the God who stakes his very being on Israel's perfecting.

God in his holiness, in his exaltation above nature and history, is the ground and pledge of the high calling of the nation and the individual. In direct proportion to the consciousness of the divine holiness stands the seriousness with which the fact of evil is apprehended. Over against the polity of the true Israel—that is, God's plan for humanity—stands the world, a vast bulk of moral indifference, moral indolence, and downright opposition to the will of God and the well-being of the nation. Between things as they are and things as they ought to be is a gulf so deep and wide that to all appearances it cannot be bridged. But faith in God and in man's capacity to apprehend and obey God bridges the gulf. There is nothing truly real save God's plan for history. By faith man makes that plan his very own. God's will becomes the prophet's own will. He makes the final and supreme act of self-assertion.

Here begins the historical career of our master-word, faith. It has its roots in the soil of lower religions. It inherits the task undertaken by the primitive cultus or ritual. But where ritual fails, faith succeeds. The ritual asserts the solidarity between the seen and unseen worlds in language that the eye can take in, and thereby robs the unknown of its terrors. Faith does the same thing, but after the cultus has reached the limit of its power, after the inner life has asserted and won its rights, after universal history has, so far as all appearances go, vetoed the possibility of national success. Then, refusing to turn aside from the highway of history in order to go off into a monastic retreat, the prophet, his consciousness flushed with the invasive energy of God, his eyes seeing in the crisis of history the promise and potency of divine presence and power, triumphantly asserts and affirms himself. "Faith," Renouvier happily says, "is but the self" (*Psychologie rationnelle*, iii, p. 80). But it is self in the widest and deepest sense, the self that includes the nation and reaches down to the base and bottom of the moral law. Through a supreme act of will and of self-assertion man rises to a hope "that can create from its own wreck the thing it contemplates."

The great value of the New Testament as a book of witness to the nature of religion is due to two causes. One is the fact that it is the literary by-product of the supreme religious revolution.

The self-conscious literary element is found in it, for example, in the Epistle to the Hebrews. But, taken as a whole, it is extraordinarily free from the literary motive. The other cause is its inseparable connection with the Old Testament. It is not a book of mysticism; like the Old Testament itself it is beaten out on the anvil of history. Furthermore, it is a literature produced by a practical and social, not by an academic and speculative, movement. For example, the letters of Paul are drawn from him by crises in the development of the Pauline churches, the literary and speculative impulses are not main causes in his literary activity. Hence the New Testament stands very close to the building of community. To a peculiar degree it is instinct with common feeling and consciousness.

The New Testament, on the external side, carries the logic of prophetism over into explicit universalism. On the internal side it completes the transition from sacrifice to prayer as a method of self-expression. Psychologically considered, prayer is the deepest and intensest form of purpose. It is the will of man hewing his way into the unknown. Hence the connection between prayer and revelation. The divine will meets the high-wrought human will and, opening itself to need, lays bare the secret of self-renewing life. The prayer of the poor, that is, of the consciousness which on the one hand is deeply aware of dire need and on the other hand is dominated by the highest purpose—the prayer of the poor pierces the clouds. The very heart, the fundamental meaning, of the universe imparts itself to the heart of man.

In the thought of revelation we come upon the final note of religion as it discloses itself, when it is doing, in co-operation with economic forces, the world's primary work of grounding and developing the social consciousness. Revelation is the sense of an invasive and pervading energy coming from the deepest source of being. By reason of this energy, which flushes the veins with joyous feeling and imparts to consciousness a radiant certainty of intimacy with the unseen Power, the torment of the unknown is forever allayed, and the problem is solved. What reason and culture cannot do, namely, maintain the unity of life under the strain of increasing difficulty, is triumphantly achieved. Human being and fundamental being are made one.

A necessary consequence is that primary religious experience is accompanied by the consciousness of mystery. What is called common sense deals only with the things that are simple and clear. Vital religion breaks in upon the clear with the consciousness of the infinite. A man's feet are set in a large room. His experiences become spacious, his soul an inlet of divine reality. His reason either ripens or swoons into revelation. Common sense finds itself either allied to the mystical or besieged by it.

It is in connection with revelation as the final characteristic of religion that the idea of God as a personal being comes into full play. The personality of God is the only successful way of vitalizing the entire revealableness of the unseen powers. As individuality strikes its roots deeper while its purpose ranges farther out, as responsibility widens and burdens greaten, two paths are open to the foot. The man who has become greatly individual, in order to attain the satisfaction of his spiritual needs, may go off with the Hindu mystic, and, leaving the social and political order of things to take care of themselves, he may seek his own perfection. Or else, standing fast in his place and duties as a citizen of the visible world, he surrenders himself to a belief in the divine personality. A philosophical, or abstract, conception of ultimate being cannot serve his needs; for pure speculation invariably brings up in the thought of absolute reality as transcending the relations of human consciousness. The one and sole efficient help is found in the fact, or the fancy, of complete revelation. God is a person. His entire being comes into intimate relations with the being of man. The unseen world is found to be, or fancied to be, in perfect sympathy with outreaching and upreaching individuality. The personality of God pledges the resources of the unseen universe to man's attainment of virtue and happiness. The essential nature of religion lies in its authentication of reality. The ultimate, the final, meanings and values are brought within man's reach. "*Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.*" There is the gift of it in a nutshell.

Through the Old Testament the New Testament is kept in vital connection with the religions of antiquity and so fulfils their logic. This may be illustrated by its master-words, the correlative terms "faith" and "kingdom of God." The Book of Deuter-

onomy and the First Epistle of John, read together, will make the point clear. Faith is man's final act of self-assertion. It takes for granted a deep and clear self-consciousness. Only the mature individual can enter deeply into its meaning. But the individual by himself is not the unit of thought and feeling. Faith knows the individual only where he truly knows and finds himself, in the fellowship of his peers. Faith and the kingdom of God are inseparable parts of a single concept. Faith is the final assent, assent to a belief in the perfectibility of man as bottomed on and built upon the being and will of God or the inmost essence and reality of things. It is the strongest form of will; for by means of it a man grips a far distant end of personal and social action. He knows himself and masters himself only in the depth of fellowship. And in that self-same deep of fellowship God reveals Himself, and so overcomes the terrors of the unknown. Not on the mountain-top of the speculator nor in the cell of the monastic saint is given the beatific vision that restores integrity to consciousness, but in the heart of the community. One with his fellows, man feels his oneness with the ultimate will and force. Fear is cast out. The working will, afire with love and aglow with hope, faces the world with unfaltering and unconquerable confidence.

We have run through the history of religions in the period when religion did its most difficult work, when it helped to create states and make civilization possible and at last founded the Christian church—the most comprehensive form of social consciousness, the society that contains the largest store of idealizing energy and the most efficient body of high and penetrating motives. If we compare this work of religion in antiquity with religion in Germany, from which land all the modern definitions of religion have come, we cannot but see a striking difference. In the contemporary situation the field of experience is spaced off and divided. Science has one function and metaphysics another. The state and the church, each deeply self-conscious, are distinct and practically separated. The unit of thought and feeling is the individual, who studies religion from the side of his own need, and who, having gained a clear conception of religion that answers to his needs, then proceeds to include his neighbor within his defini-

tion. He is pretty sure to be strongly influenced by the personal equation of his generation or even of his circle. But we are beginning to suspect that in the deep of the unknown future towards which the economic and social movement, with or without our will, is carrying us, there is hidden a larger and more vitalizing conception of religion. Meantime, in order to guard ourselves against ourselves, we have undertaken to draw a definition from the history of religion taken as a whole.

We have seen that religion is the supreme form of self-assertion on man's part. He begins his career in a state of mind where God and nature are one. As he grows into clear self-consciousness, "God" becomes distinct from "nature." In the wide field of pantheistic monotheism, indeed, the distinction does not advance beyond the Stoic doctrine of the *anima mundi*. But in the narrow field of prophetic monotheism, by reason of the fact that the moral task of humanity is more seriously taken, God is exalted high above nature, and nature becomes the plastic material under his hand, being shaped toward a moral end and consummation of history. We have seen, however, that under all its ancient forms the method of religion is unvarying, namely, a sacramental manifestation of solidarity between the seen and the unseen parts of an indivisible universe. From the lowest forms to the highest there runs a continuous consciousness. We have seen, also, that the aim is everywhere the same, to overcome man's dread and terror of the unknown. Heartease amidst the torturing insecurities and uncertainties of life is the end desired. Religion brings the anxious heart of man to this end by bestowing on him the peace of the universe. The religious imagination makes life wide and spacious. Fear vanishes. The lion and the lamb lie down together. A little child shepherds the wild beasts of the earth. And, finally, we have learned that religion, when doing its hardest and most heroic work, takes on the form of a profound common feeling and consciousness.

Thus equipped, we take on ourselves the risk of a definition—perhaps it would be more safe to say, a description. Religion is that form of common consciousness through which the friendly relationship between the seen and the unseen, between human consciousness and purpose on the one side and the higher powers

and deepest tendencies on the other, is authoritatively disclosed and assented to. The unvarying quality of this consciousness is a sense of finality. Illusion and error are a necessary part of religious feeling. But the illusion and the error are held within a larger process, illusion breaking only to uncover a surer reality, and error, when it is detected, becoming a door opened into wider truth; so that the sense of finality, checked and chastened, goes from strength to strength. The known and the unknown are felt to be parts of a single and unbroken context of meaning and value.

The enduring as well as the immediate result is an assured sense of security in the possession of one's higher wealth. This sense of security is the fundamental value of life. From it, in the last analysis, all other values draw their sap and juice. It is in this way that religion has made itself the foster-parent of civilization, and that law, in the twofold sense of obligation and security in the possession of rights, has found in it a powerful ally. And here is the pith and marrow of religion. From time to time imperious needs and situations give it one or another color, and so conceptions and definitions more or less specialized come to light. But every one of them, when hard pressed, takes refuge in the larger, if vaguer, conception of a friendly relation with the unseen forces and tendencies, greater than man, which are bearing nature and history onward.

It is a matter of course that many shades and varieties of feeling and motive should blend with the religious consciousness when once its primary character is understood. Things which by nature are secondary are caught up by the religious feeling, and so completely incorporated with it that they seem to be an organic part of religion itself. Indeed, they may actually become necessary to religion as a working force. And so various shades of religious feeling come into being. But the pith of the thing is the sense of security created by the consciousness of union with the unseen powers. The relation between this primary element and the secondary elements which intertwine with it is happily illustrated by the relation between the primary and secondary elements in the total impression made on us by the highest order of beauty. Thus into one's consciousness of the incomparable

beauty of the Yellowstone Cañon there inevitably comes the thought of the vast period of geological time that has gone to its making, and the effect of its sublime loveliness is thereby enhanced. Or again, into the deep pleasure given by the beauty of a great wheat-field in the North-west may come the thought of the large uses into which the grain shall pass. But the primary thing is the beauty itself. So it is with the religious consciousness. It changes color with changing situations. Its essential character, however, is a joyous, radiant confidence in the nature and constitution of the unseen universe.

Naturally, religion purifies itself as the mental objects of man multiply in number and increase in range. It is a long march from the early tribal period, when the food-question was always pressing and the most real things were the things immediately at hand, to our scientific age with its immense range of disinterested knowledge and its splendid ability to realize distant ends. Science, therefore, is bound to affect, in increasing measure, the color and complexion of the religious motive. But the essential nature of religion is unchanging. In truth, the practical and the theoretical aspects of science, taken together, bring out in the clearest light the old truths. For, on the practical side, science has made possible, through inventions, the vast nation of modern times and has imparted to it an irresistible tendency towards democracy. Now democracy involves a tremendous increase in the seriousness of the moral task of humanity. A great mass of people who in ancient days would have had no standing within the mind of the idealist in our time possess both collective and individual significance. Consequently, the labor of moralizing the community is very much greater for the modern idealist than it was for Plato. Plato, with perfect rectitude, could wipe the masses off the slate. Their one function was to be governed. But in a modern democracy the supreme function of the same class of people is to govern themselves. The task of lifting them to the level of self-government immensely increases the strain upon the collective moral purpose which is the source of true law within the community. But that moral purpose must find its stronghold in a growing body of advanced individuals, and these individuals, gladly dooming themselves to entire responsibility

for the common welfare, will be irresistibly driven into conscious relations with the deepest forces and tendencies of the universe. And the law of life becomes, in their experience, a constantly repeated act of faith in the universe or God on the one side and in their nation and race on the other. And since this act of faith is made necessary by the terrific contrast between things as they are and things as they ought to be, science itself on its practical side brings into clear light the motive of religion.

Again, on the theoretical side also the same thing appears. The scientific conception of the universe leaves no nook or corner for the ancient notion about the terrors of nature to take refuge in. Law dominates the whole sweep of things. Yet law itself seems to give rise to an even deadlier terror. Does it not shut out freedom? does it not pour contempt on man's pride? Only in appearance. For the progress of science is irrevocably wedded to the fortunes of the free state. The universe must be thought or felt to guarantee the increasing well-being of man. And this thought and feeling are essentially religious. They quite transcend verifiable experience. They necessitate, and they rest upon, a supreme act of faith—faith in the inner constitution of the universe and faith in man's kinship to it. Our majestic conception of the universe drives us into the conviction that the deepest meanings and powers are on the side of the highest human purpose. By means of that conviction we make our peace with the stones of the field and with an apparently merciless and unpitying nature. A sense of security in our struggle for the rights of mankind pervades and possesses us. Now this is the pith and marrow of religious feeling. So the definition, or description, of religion taken from antiquity suits our needs and conditions fairly well. Religion, as a matter of feeling and thought, is for us the consciousness of intimate and friendly relations with the unseen powers and tendencies of the universe. As a matter of will, it is an assured confidence regarding the moral quality and the moral end of history. The life of the nation and the life of the race are worthy of hearty participation on the part of the choicest spirits, because through religion the heart of things, called God, enters into an enduring connection or covenant with the heart of man.

GEORGE FOX AS A MYSTIC

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This paper is but a fragmentary contribution to that study of the "Varieties of Religious Experience" which William James has so significantly brought to the attention of students of human nature. I propose to sketch some personal peculiarities of the founder of Quakerism, George Fox, and in the end to show what place was filled in his life by what may be called his experiences as a mystic. Every one knows that the typical Quakers have made prominent amongst their spiritual exercises what they call "silent worship" as conducted in their meetings, and that they have held that this "silent worship" often brings the worshipper under the direct influence of the movings of the Divine Spirit. I have here no concern with any question as to the truth or as to the ultimate merits of this or of any other tenet of George Fox or of his followers. I intend simply to show the place that the experiences of silent worship occupied in the mental life of Fox himself, and why he found this form of what is technically called mysticism a valuable feature of his religious consciousness. This study will bring us into somewhat closer contact with the mental complications of a remarkable personality—a personality in which the normal and the abnormal were in a very interesting way united. We shall see how certain tendencies that, in another context, would have proved highly dangerous to the sanity of their possessor were so combined in Fox that the ultimate result was prevailingly good, both for himself and for his environment. Religious history contains many instances where men whose mental life showed numerous abnormal traits still were so constituted that they retained their essential self-control and accomplished a great work. The study of Fox presents one more such instance, and may also possess genuine psychological interest.

Since my discussion deals with Fox as a mystic, I shall first have to explain what one technically means by mysticism in relig-

ion. Then I shall have to show that Fox had many traits which were not those of the typical mystic. And, finally, I shall try to point out what part Fox's mystical tendencies played in determining certain aspects of his mind and of his career.

I

By a mystic in religion or in any department of life, many mean, somewhat vaguely, one who pretends to the possession of extraordinary power to know spiritual mysteries, or to control or predict fortune by supernatural means. Thus various superstitions are often spoken of as forms or instances of mysticism. So the trusting person who seeks intercourse with his dead friends at an ordinary Spiritualistic séance is sometimes called a mystic. Sometimes the word is applied to believers in telepathy, or to people who consult fortune-tellers, or who employ any sort of divination, or even to credulous purchasers of astrological almanacs. The term, thus employed, is too loosely and widely applied to suggest any useful meaning. For, from this point of view, every form of primitive religion would include many elements of mysticism. And only those would not be mystics who abandoned making any practical use of their supposed relations with a supernatural world, and who abandoned any belief in their power to know about such a world. Everybody who is sufficiently civilized to conceive of a contrast between nature and the supernatural admits that there is something extraordinary in the establishment of close relations with the supernatural world. Seers, prophets, wonder-workers, magicians, medicine-men, devotees of all sorts, in so far as they are intelligent enough to conceive of the ordinary life of plain men as a dealing with nature, regard either themselves as extraordinary persons or their glimpses of what others do not see as extraordinary incidents in their experience. And thus, from this point of view, mysticism would come to include nearly all forms of superstition and also of the higher historical religions. But for the common elements of all these sorts of faith and practice we have names enough, without using the term "mysticism." The term itself, originally employed with reference to the Greek Mysteries, threatened indeed at one

time to become a name for all knowledge or practice that involved any sort of technical initiation or even apprenticeship. But in religious history it has been especially associated with certain great names, and has been used to denote certain famous doctrines whose common features suggest a decidedly narrower use of the word than the vague one just illustrated. And to this narrower usage I think it best to try to confine our term.

The greater religious teachers who have been most known as mystics are, in European history, first, the characteristic representatives of the Neoplatonic school; then, certain noted mediaeval and modern religious reformers and instructors who were of a more or less completely orthodox reputation in their communions (whether these communions were Catholic or Protestant); and, finally, a good many confessedly unorthodox sectarians and independent believers. Common to all these more notable and typical mystics, whatever their creed may otherwise be, is a persuasion that, through certain exercises, or by means of special supernatural influences, or, generally, through a combination of both, the properly disposed soul can attain a state in which it becomes immediately aware of the Absolute Truth, immediately acquainted with God, or with whatever else the ultimate reality or the highest truth is declared to be by the individual mystic. In this state of mystical illumination the typical mystic reports that he becomes one with the Absolute, and that he knows this ultimate truth, not by reasoning, nor yet as one knows ordinary objects by the senses, but through a direct interior revelation, through becoming simply one with the object known. The mystic knowledge is consequently sharply distinguished, by the reports of all the typical mystics, from every other form of insight. It not only acquaints them, so they say, with another grade of Being than that which either reason or sense ever displays to men, but it also acquaints them with this absolute object in a wholly unique fashion, namely, by an immediate presence of the object which is nowhere else possible in case of any knowing process. Thus the mystic knowledge is often characterized as something beyond all definite consciousness. It must be portrayed to the vulgar in negative terms, together with but one positive predicate, viz., that it is *better*, or is *higher*,

than all other knowledge, or is *beyond, above, more precious*, than whatever else is called knowledge. Thus the object known by the typical mystic is, like the mystical state itself, something quite ineffable and indescribable. One must say of this object that it has *none* of the predicates that ordinary beings possess. And so far one's account of it is indeed wholly negative. The mystics, who love paradoxes, enjoy baffling common sense by emphasizing this their "negative theology." Their ultimate is what common sense would call nothing at all. The typical mystics not only admit this fact, but they glory in it. For this nameless unity, this formless glory, which common sense finds to be nothing, they find to be the source of all things, the ground and reality of whatever exists, the most real and ultimate of truths. And this positive attribute they assign to their Absolute for a reason which they try to articulate thus: This object of the mystic insight is *above*, is *beyond*, is *higher* than, is *better* than, is ineffably *superior* to, every finite being, because it possesses in a transcendent degree that which all imperfect beings are, so to speak, trying to possess, namely, finality and perfection. Hence in its perfection the object of the mystic knowledge possesses all the attributes of the God of the faithful.

Historically, this doctrine of the typical mystics is not limited to the confines of Christianity, nor to the wider territory within which not only Christianity proper but also its offshooting sects and heresies, as well as the Neoplatonic doctrines have flourished. Mysticism, under other names, developed some of its most typical forms in India, its probable birthplace. The prevailing doctrine of those ancient scriptures called the Upanishads is a form of mysticism. The philosophical school known as the Vedanta gave mysticism its completest technical expression, not as a mere phase of religious experience, but as the culminating doctrine of a system of metaphysics. Some typical forms of mysticism have also prospered in certain ages and sects of the Mohammedan world.

On the whole, despite the number and variety of these typical mystics, many of them agree in certain mental traits sufficiently to make them constitute a sort of psychological type. What interests us in the notable mystics is, first, the fact that they unite,

in surprising ways, high and even critical intelligence with great and sometimes abnormally strong emotional tendencies. Secondly, with their emotional life they often combine, in rather paradoxical fashion, strongly sensuous traits, such as are shown in their frequent fondness for extremely sensuous metaphorical language, with a marked asceticism of life and doctrine. And, thirdly, they often join their fondness for strange and impractical emotional experiences, for passive rapture, for abnormal inner concentration, with great skill, calm objectivity, and strenuousness in carrying on their life-work. Extravagant mystics have sometimes been good leaders of religious orders, effective managers of complex organizations or of worldly affairs.

If such is the essence, the historical place, and some of the psychological interest of the typical mysticism, we are naturally puzzled to see why so paradoxical a teaching should have led captive so many noble minds. For the typical mystics, while they include many simple-minded or even superstitious folk, also comprise amongst their number many decidedly ingenious, acute, and philosophical thinkers. In fact, the mystical philosophers, for instance the Vedantists, Plotinus, Eckhart, and even Spinoza, are often found to be amongst the most technical and critical inquirers, at least in all subjects not too directly connected with their mystical experience. Moreover, since the mystics are often lofty characters and powerful leaders, one cannot attribute their absorption in their vision of the Absolute to mere narrowness or poverty of inner life.

And so the mystic seems to be, on the one hand, paradoxical, credulous, adoring an empty vision which he calls an immediate knowledge of ultimate truth; while on the other hand he shows himself to be, by the wealth of his nature, the earnestness of his piety, and—in case of the principal philosophical mystics—by the ingenuity of his thinking processes, a person of whom the impartial critic would have expected better things. Why then, such a critic asks, does the mystic suppose the experiences of his trance, the mere nothingness of which his ecstasy makes him dimly aware, to be a revelation of ultimate truth?

This is no place to estimate the philosophical value of mysticism. But I venture to point out what I take to be the main

reason why the typical mystic conceives himself to be able, in his trance, to become directly acquainted with the Absolute.

The typical mystic, then, is, first, a person who has become convinced, through his religious faith or through his processes of thinking, that God, or the Absolute Truth, by whatever name that truth is called, possesses a perfection, a goodness, and a completeness and unity, which do not exist in any object of our ordinary experience or discursive thought. So far we have a perfectly normal form of religious conviction. Our typical mystic is, secondly, a person who longs and hopes to get some sort of close communion with God, so that he himself, and not another, shall view the Truth as it is in itself. This hope and this desire may indeed seem bold to the unsympathetic critic; but they are at least human enough to be, by themselves, quite intelligible incidents of piety. Now, thirdly, in the course of his religious exercises or of his philosophical reflections, the typical mystic observes that when, with his thoughts fixed upon the divine things in which he already believes, he abandons himself to the contemplation of them, and so forgets the things of outer sense and the fragmentary truths of ordinary discursive thought, he assumes more and more a certain inner state of delightful contemplation, while conflict and complexity give place to peace. All this happens because, since divine things are conceived as good, one delights in them; and, since God is conceived as One, the man who thus steadfastly contemplates him loses sight of all variety; while, since God is perfect and all-powerful, to meditate upon him is to dwell upon that against which nothing can contend and which is therefore in perfect peace. Now as one centralizes one's consciousness about these associations connected with unity, simplicity, perfection, peace, and joy, the result is twofold. First, it is, as to the concrete objects of contemplation, principally negative, because the typical mystic carefully avoids thinking of distracting varieties. Hence he dwells upon whatever is *not* one of God's mere creatures. Thus far he is, indeed, dwelling upon what common sense, which only takes account of creatures, calls nothing. Secondly, however, the nearer the mystic comes to dwelling upon no concrete object at all, the surer he feels that he is contemplating that which, by

its attributes of goodness, unity, and peace, is rendered far higher than all the concrete objects which he is forsaking. For to the mystic the unity thus approached is God. Thus the mystic is progressing toward a wilderness where nothing is to be found by mortal sense, and yet he is sure that in this wilderness is to be found the home of his soul, the very God whom he set out to seek.

Now the limit of this mental process, in the mystic's experience, is a state of consciousness in which nothing at all is present. Towards this limit he constantly strives. But since every step toward this goal leads toward that which is, by hypothesis, higher than the more complex objects of any previous stage, and so is a step nearer to God, the mystic, through a pleasing fallacy, familiar to all students of the doctrine of limits, easily supposes that whenever that limit is reached, and whenever the Nothing is consequently faced, God, the all-perfect, must thereby become known. Hence the object of the mystic's trance is to him divine, while for all who are not in such a trance it is indeed nothing. The mystic is confirmed in his belief by the fact that, as he approaches the ultimate state, his joy is more untroubled, just because all thoughts of variety, of problems, of complexities, are vanishing. Hence, in knowing the Absolute that is also nothing, the mystic holds that he must obtain the satisfaction of desire, the perfect peace. He must, therefore, have become one with the Absolute Good.

So much for some indication of the nature of the typical mysticism, and for a hint as to why it has seemed persuasive even to very critical thinkers, and still more to uncritically devout souls who have been in search of the presence of God.

II

I now turn directly to Fox, and shall try to show in what sense there was a mystical trait in him. We shall find that mysticism, although but an auxiliary element, was still an indispensable part of his character. Had George Fox been known to his fellow-men chiefly as a mystic, he would have been less influential, and might have been soon forgotten. Even his mysticism became

as influential as it was over other men's lives because it was but a part of his strength. What made him historically important was his practical work as a leader of men, as an organizer of religious communities, as a social reformer, and as a consistent expounder and exemplar of one of the principal ideals that resulted from the English Reformation. This was the ideal of a spiritual unity of all men, to be established apart from outward formality, and to be sustained solely by voluntary conformity.

Still, this ideal was closely connected, in the personal experience of Fox, with a form of religious consciousness akin to that known in history by the name of mysticism. Yet Fox, as we shall see, was not a typical mystic. And, in fact, just the difference between his experience and that of the typical mystics proves to be the feature of his religious life which was most in his favor as an effective teacher. For since he was no poet and no speculative thinker, since he was neither possessed of a richly sensuous imagination nor fond of long continued unpractical contemplation, his experiences in the mystical realm, important as they proved to be for his life, would have meant little to him or to others, had they not always been swiftly translated into terms of humane activity. Other mystics have written words that people treasure for their own sake as pure literature, or as speculative illumination, or as emotional inspiration; but what Fox wrote was meant to guide his followers in their tasks and in the problems of their generation, and was bare of all adornment save that which its fervent practical spirit inevitably produced. Even his *Journal*, detailed as its record of personal experience is, is written rather as the soldier records his campaigns than as the typical mystic tells of that wondrous journey which he believes leads Godwards. "That all may know," so Fox begins his *Journal*, "the dealings of the Lord with me, and the various exercises, trials, and troubles through which he led me, in order to prepare and fit me for the work unto which he had appointed me, . . . I think fit, before I proceed to set forth my public travels in the service of truth, briefly to mention how it was with me in my youth."

One sees, even in these opening words of the *Journal*, the

epitome of his life as he himself surveyed it. The Lord had wrought it; but what the Lord had meant was "to prepare and fit" him "for the work"; and the dealings of the Lord with him in his youth were a preliminary to his true career, namely, to the "public travels in the service of truth." One must always remember these "public travels" and the constant, intimate, and varied social relations which they involved, whenever one is dwelling upon the inner life of Fox. In his youth, Fox knew a good deal about what spiritual solitude meant; but he never revelled in such solitude for its own sake as the typical mystics do. On the contrary, until he found the way out of it he was ill at ease. He was perfectly capable of meeting God "in the bush," and was always very sure that God dwells not in temples made with hands; but he had no wish to avoid "the mart and the crowded street," provided only that he could utter his testimony in the presence of his fellows; and he obviously preferred to look for God in the Meeting, side by side with his brethren. The religion of Fox was thus a very insistently social religion, in which solitude was an incident, not a goal. His strong spirit needed no isolation to secure inner peace. Contemplation was compatible with work; and the Light was still with him in the company of his Friends.

Now these things, as I have said, are not wholly characteristic of the typical mystics. The latter too have often been reformers, or men and women of considerable social activity. But in general they tend to a certain primary separation of the outer and the inner man, of the works of charity and the illuminations of the Spirit, to a sundering of the contemplation of God and the service of the world. They try, indeed, to bridge over this division of their life, to reunite their mysticism with their duty as members of religious orders, or as teachers and reformers. Some of them succeed in such a reconciliation of the opposing forces. But usually the peace that passeth all understanding makes their daily business seem a little shadowy to them, while their hearts are with God, the Ineffable, and with his moveless rest that lies beyond all finitude. Fox, however, despite his many contradictory traits, knows nothing of just this sort of division of spirit. His God is not only the ocean of light, but also the counsellor of

deeds. And even the Light, Fox praises not merely for its purity, but for what it enables him to discern.

George Fox was born in 1624, in Leicestershire, the son of a weaver, and died in January, 1691, at the age of sixty-six. His mature life was one of great activity in the service of his cause, the cause of early Quakerism. At eight distinct times he suffered considerable periods of imprisonment for the sake of his religious faith and practice. He wrote extensively, labored hard in organizing the various communities of Friends both in England and abroad, and for many years was almost constantly engaged, so far as his health permitted, in attending meetings, in travelling, and in writing his epistles to his brethren. The trials and strains of this life, and especially the hardships endured in the wretched jails of his time, wore heavily upon his constitution. He aged early; and in the latter part of his life was much beset by illnesses. We thus have considerable means of judging how far he was originally a man of sound brain, since the events of his life severely tested his sanity; and we can face with some prospect of success the question which should precede the study of his mysticism, namely, the question how far Fox shows signs of the nervous and mental instability which are so often found in people of extraordinary religious experience. The result of an examination of the main facts may first be so stated as to indicate at once wherein lay the unquestionable strength of our reformer. Fox's most characteristic religious activities, as a mature man, were consistent, humane, and free from most of the extravagances to which the troubles of the age, the enthusiasm of his followers, and even some of his own beliefs, constantly tempted him. The social state of England was then most dangerous, since persecution, controversy, changing forms of faith and government, and fanatical sectarianism prevailed. Yet on the whole Fox learned to live and to work in this social atmosphere with increasing mental steadiness, with essentially calm self-control, and with effectiveness. He learned to avoid, as time went on, some of his earlier mistakes. He grew more objective, more influential, stronger in soul. He joined authority of bearing with the steady determination to frown down the more violently intolerant tendencies of his day. He was indeed a stern controversialist; but he kept

his hostilities under the strict control of his Quaker principles. His own attitude toward the problems of his sect was always objective. He joined great self-assurance with real freedom from any disposition to self-aggrandizement. His emotional life, in spite of painful vicissitudes, remained relatively calm. In his maturer years his mental distresses seem to have been largely caused by sympathy with the misfortunes of his brethren. Despite his natural vehemence of speech, he was relatively uncomplaining as to his personal griefs. Despite physical weakness, he labored diligently to the end.

So far we have the picture of the saner aspect of his nature which predominated in his social activities. But in contrast with this picture we must record some decided mental anomalies. They are of sorts well known in religious history; but, as they were combined in Fox, they are often decidedly hard to estimate.

We have to judge of these anomalous aspects of Fox's character very largely upon the basis of his own reports. It is well, therefore, to try to get first an impression of some of his most general traits, both as shown in his career and in his writings. These general traits will not in themselves constitute his more anomalous tendencies. But we may better judge the value of his more special accounts of his experience, and may also understand why his reports must leave us in doubt as to certain very interesting questions, when we have first seen, apart from his more doubtful peculiarities, what manner of man, on the whole, he was.

First, then, a word as to Fox's mode of life. As a child, still more as a youth, he was very serious-minded, always deeply interested in religious problems, and always, according to his years, undoubtedly sober and discreet in conduct. There was in his youth no period of wild living or of impiety. There was—and this is very notable—no crisis of conversion. Fox's period of youthful doubt and distress was almost wholly filled with problems regarding his mission from the Lord and regarding the relief of the very evil state in which he saw other people living. He was early concerned with the problem of salvation; but his distress or despair was more connected with the salvation of his countrymen than with that of his own soul. His religious,

and in fact his entire, education depended upon the reading of his English Bible. Like his countryman and contemporary, John Bunyan, he was a typical product of this time of intense enthusiasm for religious reform, when earnest men, ignorant like himself of all technical erudition, and let loose, so to speak, without any control but their Bible and their own consciences, struggled with the problems of Christianity as if no historical church had ever existed to define a traditional faith and practice, and believed themselves as near as were the Apostles to the sources of divine guidance. Fox, like many others of his time, had no interest in life that was not directly colored by his religious fervor. From early manhood on he was constantly engaged in discussing passages of Scripture, in criticising religious beliefs and practices, in counselling his fellows, in taking part in religious exercises, in planning religious activities. His life, as we have seen, early became that of the wandering preacher. His travels were actually very extensive.

In view of this wandering and unworldly nature of his career, we should now note that Fox was nevertheless always careful of his small, yet, for one of his frugal habits, apparently sufficient store of money. He often mentions how he paid, or offered to pay, for what he needed on his journeys. Nobody, so far as I know, ever accused him of unfairness in the use of money. Yet he never seems to have been in actual need, although he earned nothing by his work as a preacher, except in so far as he made use of the free hospitality offered by Friends to a travelling preacher. He always vehemently condemned the practice of the State clergy in preaching for hire. His practice in this matter surely agreed with his preaching. We do not know the source of his small income, though at first his parents seem to have supplied him with some money. What we know is that he was as economical and careful as he was unworldly. When, quite late in life, he married a widow of means and position, he insisted in advance upon a settlement which placed her property beyond his control, and which fully protected the rights of her children. He was always scrupulously honest.

But, in connection with this choice of the life of the wandering preacher, we next come upon a trait of Fox's character which is

central, and which his biographers do not always emphasize as I do, in my efforts to understand the man. Fox belongs to what some students of character like to call the "motor" type of personality. He is, so far as his purely external fashion of behavior is concerned, a notably active, restless, or perhaps I should say an unresting, type of man. This aspect of his character is all the more interesting in view of its contrast with the vein of mysticism of which we are soon to speak. It is also interesting because of its further contrast with his marked seasons of strange physical weakness and other signs of invalidism. Of course Fox himself is not wholly aware of the nature of this trait of motor restlessness in his character. Yet page after page of his lengthy diary illustrates it. Fox supposes his wanderings to be wholly for the service of the Lord. It is plain to the reader that he learned to serve the Lord in this way largely because his temperament forbade him to stay long in any one place. An unsympathetic reader might be tempted to view his first recorded travels as symptoms of a youthful tendency to vagabondage. During his period of religious unrest, before he discovered his mission, his lonely journeys were, indeed, in outward seeming, so aimless as to suggest the presence of some deeper defect in his nature. Yet even these wanderings were determined not so much by painful emotion as by the mere necessity of movement and of action. Fox at first—so he tells his story—seeks among the people whom he later disapprovingly calls "the priests and professors" for light on religious problems. He goes from place to place upon this quest. Nobody gives him satisfactory guidance. So he wanders unrestingly further. Sometimes he seems merely to be looking, as if in a forest of doubts, for some undefined supernatural aid. But sometimes he strives toward a more definite goal. For as a youth he is curious to go and see whether any one can be found who has any new light upon religious truth. Thus, as he narrates, once during this early period he learns of a fasting woman whose supposed supernatural powers have attracted attention. He decides that he must seek her out. He sees her; but in a very characteristic fashion he reacts to her presence by forthwith "discerning," as he says, that hers is not the right sort of religious life. So

he tells her what he "has from the Lord" for her, and goes his way.

But this quick response to situations, this eager willingness to go any distance to gain an end, this readiness for brisk motor activity, does not leave Fox with his youth. It remains to mould his whole career. It helps him to administrative deeds of much importance for the later and more organized stages of the life of the Quaker society. Meanwhile it often appears in ways that surprise his intimates. Once in later years, when he was ill, and his friends believed him dying, he rises suddenly from his bed, as we shall soon see from his own account, and demands a coach to go and visit a friend, twelve miles away, who is really dying. He is never content to settle permanently in a single community. In the course of his life he visits all parts of England. He wanders to Scotland, to Ireland, and even to America. His example makes of all the early Quaker teachers a remarkably wandering community. Of course, circumstances and the needs of the time determine much of this wandering. But Fox's temperament is deeper than all circumstances. Were he an angel in heaven, he would prefer a missionary expedition into the deeps to an eternity of rest in the beatific vision. And so it is no wonder that those experiences of direct supernatural revelations which he called his "openings" are especially impulses to action, motor "automatisms," which Fox cultivated with an insistence that would unquestionably have proved very perilous to a weaker brain than his.

One other general trait of Fox's mind may still be mentioned before going on to more special matters. This is the very great extent and detail of his memory for events, and of his interest in such social and personal matters as had directly to do with his life-work. Much of his so-called Journal is plainly written some time after the events which he narrates. Yet the great multitude of incidents, the care in stating the precise order in which journeys, meetings, sermons, interviews, and the like, occurred, and the conscientious effort for accuracy of report, show Fox's mind to be one for which a sober and minute, and obviously laborious, record of his daily work had great interest. The general tone of the diary is, as we shall soon see, mainly objective.

That is, Fox, despite his sense of the importance of his religious mission, has a very wholesome freedom from any exaggerated sort of self-consciousness.

From these general features of Fox's character, we turn to more special facts that characterize him. We have already said that this unresting and patient worker, humane, benevolent, and effective as he was, suffered frequently from illnesses. Some of these have a psychological interest. Taken by themselves, as Fox reports them, they would give us a very different view of the man from any that we have yet obtained in this account. I cannot tell what caused these illnesses, or how they would have appeared to an expert observer. Fox records them in his *Journal*. But of their nature he knew only what his consciousness and his memory told him—necessarily an unscientific knowledge. We note, however, that his memory of some of these illnesses was decidedly fuller and clearer than of others.

At the age of twenty, as Fox tells us in his *Journal*, and during a very critical period of his religious development: "A great work of the Lord fell upon me, to the admiration of many, who thought I had been dead; and many came to see me about fourteen days. For I was very much altered in countenance and person, as if my body had been new moulded or changed. While I was in that condition, I had a sense and discerning given me by the Lord, through which I saw plainly that when many people talked of God and Christ, etc., the serpent spoke in them; but this was hard to be borne." Another and less mysteriously described attack, which Fox also refers to a mental cause, is recorded in 1659, when Fox was thirty-five years of age. The political troubles of the time and the sympathetic distresses caused by the persecutions of Quakers are here assigned as the occasions of Fox's trouble. "After awhile," he says in his *Journal*, "I went to Reading, where I remained under great sufferings and exercises, and in great travail of spirit for about ten weeks. For I saw there was great confusion and distraction amongst the people, and that the powers were plucking each other to pieces. . . . While I was under that sore travail at Reading, by reason of grief and sorrow of mind, and the great exercise that was upon my spirit, my countenance being altered, and my body

became poor and thin." Hereupon, as Fox tells us, certain "unclean spirits" (that is, certain evil-minded people living in that town) came to him and told him that the plagues of God were upon him. Fox vigorously repudiated this interpretation of his state, and, after he had "travailed with the witness of God," he came, through further spiritual exercises, "to have ease." "And then," he continues, "having recovered, my body and face swelled when I came abroad into the air. Then the bad spirit said, 'I was grown fat,' and they envied at that also. So I saw that no condition nor state would please that spirit of theirs; but the Lord preserved me by his power and spirit through and over all; and in the Lord's power I came to London again."

In 1670, when Fox was forty-six years old, there occurred another illness wherein the mental aspect is prominent. By this time his constitution had suffered heavily in consequence of imprisonments, and several serious illnesses whose physical causes were obvious enough in the unwholesome surroundings of prisons, had preceded the present attack. He records his experience as follows:—

The next day we passed towards Rochester. And on the way, as I was walking down a hill, a great weight and oppression fell upon my spirit. I got my horse again; but the weight remained so heavy on me that I was hardly able to ride. At length we came to Rochester; but I was much spent, being so extremely loaden and burdened with the world's spirits [that is, with trouble about the persecution of Friends] that my life was oppressed under them. I got with difficulty to Gravesend, and lay at an inn there, but could hardly either eat or sleep. The next day . . . John Stubbs and I went over the ferry into Essex. We came to Horn Church, where was a meeting on the first day. After the meeting I rode with great uneasiness to Stratford, to a Friend's whose name was Williams. . . . Here I lay exceeding weak, and at last lost both my hearing and my sight. Several Friends came to me from London. I told them, "I should be as a sign to such as would not see, and such as would not hear the truth." In this condition I continued a pretty while. Several came about me; and though I could not see their persons, I felt and discerned their spirits, who of them was honest-hearted, and who was not. Divers Friends, who practised physic, would have given me medicines; but I was not to meddle with any; for I was

sensible I had a travail to go through; and therefore spoke to Friends, to let none but solid weighty Friends be about me. Under great sufferings, groanings, travails, sorrows, and oppressions I lay for several weeks; whereby I was brought so low and weak in body that few thought I could live.

Fox's death was, he tells us, actually reported at this time in London. But he himself viewed his case all the while as not dangerous to life; for he was aware that the Lord's power was supporting him. After a time he recovered "a little glimmering sight," and hereupon rose from his bed and insisted upon being carried to see a dying Friend, one Gerard Amor, whom he greatly consoled. Thereafter Fox remained at Enfield, in a very weak state, all the winter. As his quoted words indicate, he interpreted this whole illness as a divinely sent spiritual experience. All through the following winter he was "warring in spirit with the evil spirits of the world that warred against truth and Friends. For there were great persecutions at this time." In some way he thus connected his illness with the need that he should inwardly struggle in order to bear his share of the burdens of his persecuted brethren, and so help them. His pain was lightened by inward visions of the state of the New Jerusalem, within which, as he insists, "all who are within the light of Christ" already dwell; "the gates whereof stand open all the day (for there is no night there) that all may come in." "After some time," says Fox, "it pleased the Lord to allay this violent persecution" (namely, that which the Friends were suffering); "and I felt in spirit an overcoming of the spirits of those man-eaters that had stirred it up, and carried it on to that height of cruelty, though I was outwardly very weak. And I plainly felt, and those Friends that were with me, and that came to visit me, took notice, that, as the persecution ceased, I came from under the travails and sufferings which had laid with such weight upon me; so that towards spring I began to recover, and to walk up and down, beyond the expectation of many."

Such cases as these seem to show that Fox was occasionally subject to somewhat lengthy attacks, in which spiritual troubles, usually of a highly humane and sympathetic character, were associated with nervous disturbances, which, at least once, in-

cluded the temporary loss of hearing and of sight. The attacks were attended with great prostration, with altered nutrition, and with the belief that his countenance was profoundly changed in a way that attracted much attention. He understood that at least twice those near him at such times had thought him either dead or very near death. While his consciousness at those times was usually depressed, he had some memory, and sometimes a very clear memory, of how he had felt. During such times he had at least intervals of a strong sense of heightened discernment, which seemed to him of a more or less clairvoyant or telepathic character. These attacks came on, as it appears, slowly, with gradually increasing weakness. They passed away without any periods of excitement. In spite of nervous depression, Fox experienced no change in his usual views of life or of his mission. The attacks were painful, but brought no despair.

Next, Fox was subject, throughout his career, to strong intuitions, to experiences which he always viewed as immediate revelations from the Lord, in brief, to what he called "openings." In estimating these experiences, we must of course remember that, as a man whose whole education was obtained from the English Bible, Fox was, by essentially normal processes of reasoning, convinced, as were thousands of devout souls in his day, that the properly prepared worshipper should be able to receive the Lord's direct guidance. Fox, as is well known, held that this guidance ought to be just as direct, and on occasion just as detailed and authoritative, as that given to the ancient prophets and apostles. This tenet was an essential article of that "everlasting gospel" which he daily preached, and this same tenet became one of the most characteristic of the beliefs of the Quakers. As a fact, therefore, Fox did not regard himself as peculiarly privileged among men by reason of his "openings"; but he rather held that the power to receive such direct revelations is a universal test of piety. He used this test in his controversies: If Christ dwells in you, he helps you, even in your daily business. And if you can get no sign of such direct help, then you are no true Christian. This is Fox's doctrine; and he reaches it by what are, on his presuppositions, perfectly normal, even though mistaken, processes of argument. His personal revelations must of course

be judged accordingly. As to their contents, Fox's "openings" take the form, first, of comforting, or inspiring, or prophetic inner visions. These are described, in general, in no very vivid or plastic way, so far as the merely sensuous imagery is concerned. I suspect that they were often rather felt or verbally supplemented than visualized with any great detail. Hallucinations of vision appear in his case mostly in the form of mere color and light visions. But, secondly, the more important and constantly recurrent of Fox's "openings" are not these inner visions, but assume rather a more directly motor form as impulses to action. Fox "has it from the Lord" that he shall do thus or thus. Or it is "given to him" to speak this or that. The general importance of this motor aspect of Fox's character, the prevalence of decisions, of confident activities, is thus extensively illustrated.

Still a third type of the "openings" we find in what Fox calls a "discerning" of truths. What he thus "discerns" is in general something of practical importance. He is, for instance, a "discerner of spirits," and knows at a glance the inmost characters of the people whom he meets; and to his actual skill in this respect some of his most celebrated brethren later bore witness in their obituary testimonies. Some of his inner visions express other of his discernments. He has, as we saw, prophetic visions, occasionally attended with simple visual hallucinations of light or of color. But these visions usually relate to important political, social, or religious crises, and warn or otherwise guide him. In general, these "discerning" processes show him the contrasts of things, enable him to tell good from evil, to expose false teachers, refute disputants, and the like.

Some of the "openings," in the fourth place, take the form of voices. "I heard a voice say," he occasionally tells us. But, on the whole, one may doubt whether these voices often had the character of true auditory hallucinations. They appear, in general, more like those interior voices whose mental material consists rather of motor speech imagery than of words vividly heard.

If one considers the various sorts of "openings" together, one finds that, even in their most pronounced forms, they usually keep nearer to the boundary of the normal than one might at

first be disposed to think. For, whatever their contents, their meaning is usually humane, benevolent, objective, and commonly in perfectly reasonable relation to Fox's life-work. They are indeed automatisms that, in a weaker brain, would have tended toward the systematizing of delusions. But in the context of Fox's life they acquired, and on the whole kept, a decidedly sane bearing upon his general plans; and that he made so much of them, and believed in them so steadfastly, is due quite as much to his theology and to his education as to their own character.¹

It remains, in this sketch of Fox's mental type, to notice one very important contrast between his experiences and those of many other religiously-minded persons. It is common, in the history of religious struggles, to meet with the experiences of those who are of the general type of the ordinary anxious, nervous invalid. Such may be people of genius, as was, for instance, Fox's contemporary, Bunyan. They may gain enough self-control to triumph finally over their ills. But their story, while it lasts, is always very different from that of Fox. The ordinary nervous sufferer, the victim of a sensitive heredity, or of an overstrain, or of both, first of all suffers from various masses of abnormal sensations and feelings, and then defines his practical prob-

¹ There is indeed one exceptional automatism which occurred during Fox's youth, and which has suggested to many critics a graver interpretation. This is his famous act of walking barefoot through the city of Lichfield, by the command of the Lord, crying, "Woe! Woe! to the bloody city of Lichfield." This has often been regarded as a peculiarly insane expression of excitement, because there was no discoverable objective ground for the act. I regard the incident as intelligible enough in the context of Fox's early life, although it was indeed pathological. But its pathological significance appears less when we remember the time, and Fox's training in automatisms, and finally his relatively normal grounds for feeling confidence in any of his "openings." Fox had just been released from his year's imprisonment at Derby. His temperament was restless, and his long confinement must have been extremely irritating. After such a release from prison the ordinary youthful convict plunges into some vicious excess. But Fox gave vent to his long imprisoned motor tendencies by this otherwise useless outburst. It was indeed plainly no normal incident. But it was less abnormal than might at first appear. The sight of the church steeples in Lichfield first stirred up hostile feelings in Fox's mind. He then felt a restless sense that something must be done—something vigorous, intense, significant. Then came a state of confusion, then an automatism to which Fox himself could assign no coherent intent, and then the final outburst. Relieved by yielding to his strange impulse, Fox forthwith became calm; and, by chance, no such incident ever occurred again.

lems in terms of his sufferings. He is therefore chiefly anxious about himself. He habitually consults friends or physicians in the hope of personal relief. He is, as Bunyan once said, "loathe to perish." His life becomes the drama of the captive seeking escape from his prison-house. But his dungeon is his own soul. His captor is his own fear. Accordingly, he becomes elaborately introspective, is expert in his own sorrows, analyzes their supposed sources, and studies his own psychology, vainly, perhaps, but devotedly. He sometimes consults his adviser with his own written notes in his hands, lest he should let some of the precious details of his case escape his own memory. He finds it hard that his adviser grows weary of his tale. His fears are most characteristic of his state, even though his fears are shadowy. Most of all, he fears himself.

Now if such a chronic sufferer, who may indeed be a genius, wins peace through his tribulations, and then, like Bunyan, undertakes to tell you about the outcome, he shows an elaborate skill in introspection which his sufferings have entailed. Bunyan's *Grace Abounding* is as transparent a confession as could be made. No essential detail that an uncultivated patient's consciousness could have perceived escapes notice. Bunyan knows nothing of psychology, and profoundly misinterprets the causes of his troubles; but his confession is a monument of untrained introspective skill; and to understand him you only need to listen to him sympathetically.

Quite otherwise is it with Fox. He never writes as the ordinary nervous invalid would. He suffers, but always about objective matters—about his practical problems and his external misfortunes. He makes no elaborate problem out of his mere suffering. He is, even in the struggles of his youth, comparatively little concerned about himself. He has few fears, and no deeper sense of guilt. During illness, death is the least of his concerns. His enemy is always outside of him, in the evil of the world, in the common foe of mankind. He has none of the ordinary nervous invalid's hesitancies. He always knows what to do. He consults no one, after he has once learned how useless the "priests" are. He has no conviction of sin, no crisis of conversion, no change of heart. Bodily weakness never abates his wholesome

self-consciousness. Accordingly, however, he is poor at introspection. He scrutinizes little the nature, the conditions, the sources, of his "openings." He knows that they are from the Lord, and that is enough. All the harder is it for us to read between the lines of the Autobiography, and learn the true psychological character of his experiences. There is no intentional concealment, but he speaks in parables. He is clear about his business and about the outer world, and he means to be frank about himself. But, since his inner spiritual exercises are from the Lord, he does not need to trace the intricacies of their origin or of their vicissitudes, as the ordinary nervous invalid would try to do. He reports the truth that the Lord has "opened" to him. That is enough. Now you see at once what the practical problem of such a nature must be. The right source of self-control must be found, the right refuge from the danger of mental chaos.

III

In following the experiences of Fox as indications of his mental constitution, we have thus at length reached the boundary where begins the truly mystical realm of his experience. Yet all that has preceded has been needful for the understanding of this realm. The "openings" are, psychologically speaking, mere automatisms, and are not of themselves sufficient to ally Fox to the great historical mystics of whom I earlier spoke. I therefore portrayed at such length the essential elements of the religious experience of those typical mystics, that we might differentiate their type from the type of the mere believers in supernatural intimations such as we have considered in Fox's case. Yet it is true that without considering Fox's "openings" we could not understand his mysticism, in so far as he was something of a mystic. It is true that most of the typical mystics had their own kind and degrees of what Fox called "openings." But closely as the two sorts of religious phenomena were connected in Fox's case and in many others, the "openings" and the central mystical consciousness are decidedly different sorts of mental facts. I have therefore dwelt upon both classes of facts sepa-

rately as a preparation for showing how they were joined in Fox.

In addition to the special "openings," the automatisms now characterized, Fox possessed a consciousness of the presence of the divine which was a central feature in what he calls the "Light"; namely, in that Light which he believed to be the most precious possession of all believers. The characterization of this Light is now needed to complete our portrayal of Fox's religious tendencies. And we find this Light to be an element in strong contrast to the features thus far emphasized, yet one that for the first time gives unity to what might otherwise have been chaotic. Like all great natures, Fox was able to harmonize apparently conflicting traits. This unresting soul, whose body so constantly, and as it were automatically, wandered, and whose voluntary and rational labors were always strenuous, had, besides its strenuousness, quite another virtue amongst its most prominent ideals. This is a virtue that the Friends from the first learned to emphasize. Its nature is suggested by phrases that constantly recur in Fox's many epistles to Friends and to those whom he hoped to convert. Let us cite an instance or two of this phraseology:—

To his parents Fox wrote, in 1652: "To that of God in you both I speak, and do beseech you both, for the Lord's sake, to return within, and wait to hear the voice of the Lord there; and waiting there, and keeping close to the Lord, a discerning will grow, that ye may distinguish the voice of the stranger when ye hear it." In the same year, in epistles to Friends, one finds such expressions as these:

To you all, dear friends, who have tasted of the immediate working power of the Lord, and do find an alteration in your minds, and do see from whence virtue doth come, and strength that doth renew the inward man, and doth refresh you; which draws you in love to forsake the world, and that which hath form and beauty in it to the eye of the world . . . to you all I say, Wait upon God in that which is pure. Though you see little, and know little, and have little, and see your emptiness, and see your nakedness, and barrenness, and unfruitfulness . . . it is the Light that discovers all this, and the love of God to you, and it is that which is immediate; but

the dark understanding cannot comprehend it. So wait upon God in that which is pure. . . . And meeting and waiting in his power, which ye have received, in it all to improve your measure that God hath given you; for ye never improve your measure, so long as you rely upon any visible thing without you. . . . When your mind runs into anything outwardly, without the power, it covers and veils the pure in you.

Such words as these at once introduce us to a thought that is thus far new in our account. Yet all who are acquainted with Fox know how central it is amongst his thoughts. It is the thought that inspires and justifies silent worship. It stands, it would seem, in a very interesting contrast to that active and unresting side of Fox's nature which we have so far emphasized. When this wanderer sits in the meeting, he can become, for the time, apart from the need of serving his brethren, a Quietist. His chief word to express this attitude is the word *wait*, used as the Psalmist uses it when he says, "I waited patiently for God." This pious *waiting* is the other virtue of which I just spoke. And what Fox wins by waiting is a certain restful consciousness of the divine presence which he defines by the term the Light—a term henceforth embodied in the Quaker vocabulary. The term was not at all new, and it certainly was scriptural. But in this emphasized usage it was intended to be mystical. Another term for such experiences is the "immediate working power of the Lord," or, briefly, "the power." To win the consciousness of this power to the full, one must be passive. But when once "the power" has wrought its work in the soul, its influence can remain during one's activities; and then one's special revelations from the Lord appear as its manifestations.

This restless soul thus added to all its other virtues the willingness to wait. And it is the waiting, with its experiences, which allies Fox to the contemplative mystics. I said that Fox was able in this way to unite somewhat contradictory tendencies. As a fact, the union was in so far a compromise as the contemplation, in Fox's case, soon tended again towards action. The "Light" is constantly spoken of in his epistles as a source of "discernment." Yet, on the other hand, not only was the Light a direct consciousness of God's presence, but it had two further

features which ally it to the classical mysticism. The one of these features relates to the reason why Fox finds the consciousness of the Light so convincing, and so immediately a revelation of God. The other relates to the character which the Light revealed as the essentially divine character.

I previously explained why the typical mystics view their ultimate vision as the revelation of the Absolute. Now Fox shows little sign of having ever striven for the attainment of the ultimate vision of the typical mystics. But it is true that he often speaks of the vision of God as something unutterable in ordinary speech, although he does not speak of it as beyond consciousness, and although he thinks of it as a state of mind that every pious soul ought daily to have. But the reason why he is sure that his vision of God is a true one has often to be articulated when he rebukes the extravagances of the more wayward or disputatious members of his sect. This reason is that, in the moment when the Light shines, peace, unity, harmony, attainment, perfection, are present to the soul. Herein the consciousness of the Light differs from the previously mentioned automatisms. They are many. It is one. They, therefore, despite their subjective certainty, might be diabolical impulses instead of divine movings, if they did not visibly proceed from that unity and tend to lead others back to it. Hence the Light is indeed a discernor of good and evil tendencies, and as such Fox constantly extols it. Nobody can say, "I am aware that God's spirit moves me to do" this or this—for instance, to go to the wars—"and now my moving of the Spirit is as good, George Fox, as are your various intuitions and your many impulses that you have from the Lord." No, the special impulses are, after all, of a lower order of revelation than is the Light. They must be judged by its simplicity, by its harmony, by its peace. The One Spirit cannot counsel conflicting tendencies, cannot approve worldly desires, cannot countenance destructive or wayward automatisms. And the test that the Light is true is this very experience that it is beyond all conflict, and is absolutely simple in its revelations. Hence all those impulses, and those only, which lead life back towards the central unity, impulses such as those to brotherhood, and peace on earth, and good will to men, and simplicity of speech, can be

justified by the Light. Thus Fox, on occasion, sets right the victims of wayward openings.

Now this reason of Fox for feeling assured of the Light as a revelation of the truly divine is essentially the same as the typical mystic's reason. There is a state of mind which is filled with harmony, unity, absolute goodness, perfect peace. The object present in this state of mind must be the God in whom all desires are fulfilled and from whom all power comes. This is the essential mystical thought.

And now, further, as to the character which the Light reveals as the truly divine: "Great things," says Fox, in speaking of the crises of his youthful experience, "did the Lord lead me into, and wonderful depths were opened unto me, beyond what can by words be declared." He then learned, as he explains, "the hidden unity in the Eternal Being." Again in his account of his early experiences he says: "I saw also that there was an ocean of darkness and death; but an infinite ocean of light and love which flowed over the ocean of darkness. . . . I saw into that which was without end, things which cannot be uttered, and the greatness and infiniteness of the love of God which cannot be expressed by words." He himself compared at the time his state with that of Paul, when Paul was caught up into the third heaven. Unity, infinity, perfection, are the predicates constantly ascribed by Fox, in his later writings, to that which the vision of God reveals. Now that these are Divine Attributes everybody has heard. Fox, however, had a strong sense that the Light enables the soul to see these attributes by a direct intuition at the moment of contemplation. This, however, is so far the typical mystic doctrine. And it is notable in this connection that Fox is comparatively indifferent to any further technical definition of God's nature except in these terms, an indifference common to all mystics. That this immediate intuition was associated in his mind with the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, is true; but the theological problems to which this doctrine leads are wholly in the background of his consciousness just in so far as he considers the central intuition of the divine presence itself. But precisely such indifference to the further articulation of the concept of the Divine Being is characteristic of the mystics.

Whether they speak of God or of Christ, of the Spirit or of the Absolute, all is to them One, and this One is unity and peace.

Here, then, is the mystical aspect of Fox's experience and of his theology. In his portrayal of the experience of the Light, the sensuous imagery so characteristic of typical mystics is very little in evidence. Yet it is not wholly lacking. The term "the Light" is itself a sensuous metaphor, although indeed a conventional one. But Fox occasionally goes further in the use of a sort of speech which mystics employ mainly because an immediate experience must indeed be formulated, if at all, in terms of sensations and of simple feelings. In 1664, at the age of forty years, Fox writes, in one of his epistles, to Friends in distress, regarding the comforts that Christ can give them: "And so think not the winter and cold weather, nor the night long; for the lilies do grow, and the gardens do give a good smell; and there is a difference between the carnal mind and a spiritual. . . . And the sun shines, and the light is clear and not dim, that you may see your way, and life, though there is a storm and tempest in the sea. And so mind the summer, and the singing of birds; and not the winter and night in which evil beasts do yell." In his youth, when the Light first came to him, it was accompanied by an especially numerous collection of interior visions, and on the other hand appeared to give to his ordinary perceptions an extraordinarily clear and vivid character. The following often quoted passage is here in question. It occurs in the record of the year 1648, when Fox was twenty-four years old:

Now was I come up in spirit, through the flaming sword, into the paradise of God. ¶ All things were new, and all the creation gave another smell unto me than before, beyond what words can utter. I knew nothing but pureness, innocency, and righteousness, being renewed into the image of God by Christ Jesus; so that I was come up to the state of Adam, which he was in before he fell. The creation was open to me; and it was showed me how all things had their names given them, according to their nature and virtue. I was at a stand in my mind, whether I should practise physic for the good of mankind, seeing the nature and virtues of the creatures were so opened to me by the Lord.

Fox soon gave up this idea, and turned back to religious plans; but this "opening" and the rejection of the plan show how the

mystic vision quickly translated itself in Fox's mind into practical form.

It was, however, just this tendency of the mystic vision to guide Fox's impulses into unity that gives the mystical aspect of his nature its actual importance in his life-work. As we saw at the outset, he never remained long absorbed in the vision. But, as we also saw in studying his "openings" in their general character, he was disposed by nature and by training to experience a variety of impulses, of openings, of automatisms, which in itself was dangerously chaotic. His humane and social tendencies were, indeed, a strongly counterbalancing influence, preventing false subjectivity. But, on the other hand, his freedom from nervous fears and from inhibitory scruples, with his vigorous self-confidence, disposed him to courses of action which, like the Lichfield incident, might have ruined his influence if he had lacked strong inner restraint. To gain such restraint was, as we have seen, the central problem of such a nature. Now it was the Light, the experience, never very trance-like, seldom very vivid or sensuously rich in coloring, but always calm, comforting, refreshing, quiet—the experience of God's immediate presence—it was this which gave his vehement active tendencies their needed rest, which brought them into consistency, which demanded that they should all be used in its service, and which saved them from chaos, from excess, and from wilfulness. Thus at length we see how Fox's mysticism, although but an auxiliary tendency in his nature, was an indispensable auxiliary.

Until, in his youth, between twenty-two and twenty-four years of age, Fox first came to know the Light as a sustained experience, his unrest was manifest, but not his mission; his piety, but not his higher self-control; his interest in religion, but not his possession of power. His automatisms were numerous and benevolent, but thus far they lacked unity. While, as I said, he never had any deep sense of guilt, some of his automatic processes occasionally seemed to him temptations of the evil one. He therefore lived for years in a state of puzzle, of inward division. The Light, when it came, meant a vision of unity—a vision that was in so far of the mystic type. The vision, at first unsteady, became habitual, controlled, and a regular

spiritual exercise. It was never the true mystic trance. It remained, however, always a sense of immediate communion with the Infinite. It thus became the Unmoved Mover, if I may use Aristotle's phrase, in his life. Henceforth his unresting nature remained; but the centre of his world had become fixed; and from that centre up to the highest heaven of his experience, the aim to imitate that which he viewed as beyond all his experience but as in immediate touch with his highest intuitions pervaded all his life. The automatisms persisted; but they became organized in the service of the one principle. The special revelations were daily with him; but they were forced to be the revelations of the same great and immovable unity which he called God.

Such, I take it, was the place of mysticism in the life of George Fox. In consequence, his untutored theology, despite its unconsciousness of philosophy, was nearer to becoming an Idealism, in the modern sense, than to being a Mysticism in the classical sense. His vision of God, despite all his quaint interpretations of Scripture and all his capricious private intimations of supernatural guidance, remained nearer to being a revelation of truth than it would have been, had he sunk deeper into the mystic trance. And, above all, the Light taught this unresting soul how to labor amid all the storms and the lurid hatreds of his day, not in vain, but humanely, valiantly, and beneficently.

*THE PRESENT POSITION OF NEW TESTAMENT
THEOLOGY*

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It is not a little significant that several books have appeared within the last year or two which deal with the subject of New Testament Theology in its whole extent. For a considerable time there has been a shrinking from this large enterprise, and the work of Holtzmann was allowed to maintain its place without serious competition. The attention of younger scholars has been more directed to the literary and historical criticism of the New Testament than to its theology; and while the theology has been by no means neglected, it has been discussed in many separate monographs rather than in works of a comprehensive nature. Now, however, we have the three books of Weinel, Feine, and Schlatter, appearing almost simultaneously, while the monumental work of Holtzmann is being reissued in a fully revised edition.

This sudden outburst of activity in a field that seemed almost abandoned may be taken in several ways as a good omen. It points, for one thing, to a revival of interest in the thought of the New Testament, which has often been half-forgotten in the controversy over subsidiary problems. Again, it is an indication that the many-sided researches of modern scholarship have yielded some assured results, so that constructive work may at last be attempted. For a number of years past, scholars have been fully occupied with the collecting of fresh data and the weighing of rival theories; the process was a necessary one, and had to be carried out with sufficient thoroughness before any conclusions could be more than tentative. It would appear that these preliminary labors are approaching completion, and that the work of building is now to be commenced. Once more, the appearance of these books, in which the primitive theology is treated as a whole, bears witness to a growing conviction that New

Testament thought is far more closely linked together than the critics of the last generation were willing to admit. The tendency has been to emphasize the cleavage between Jesus and Paul, and between Paul and the later church, with the result that each of the several phases of early doctrine has been studied in a compartment by itself. It is now coming to be recognized that no sharp lines of separation can be drawn, and that the teaching of the New Testament must be taken as a whole before we can rightly apprehend the bearing of its different parts.

We propose in this article to consider two of the works recently published, in order to arrive at some estimate of the present position of New Testament Theology and the outlook for the future. A review of four such comprehensive books is hardly practicable, and two of them, for different reasons, may be left out of account. The revised edition of Holtzmann is not yet completed, and any judgment on it would be premature; while the work of Schlatter, able and suggestive as it is, is not sufficiently representative for our purposes. The author prides himself on treating his subject from a point of view and according to methods which are peculiar to himself, and tries as far as possible to forget everything that has previously been written about it. His book is well worthy of study as the work of a vigorous though eccentric thinker, but it stands for nothing except his own individual views. Weinel and Feine, on the other hand, are representative in a high degree. Their aim is not so much to advocate private theories as to gather up the whole result of modern investigation, while in the performance of this task one of them adopts a somewhat radical and the other a somewhat conservative attitude.

By way of approach to the two books it will be well to indicate some of the new material of which the writers have been able to avail themselves, and which has made their work necessary. Holtzmann's great book has qualities of thoroughness, erudition, philosophical insight, that stamp it with a permanent value; and the revision which it is now undergoing at the hands of Jülicher will secure it in the place which it has long occupied. But since the last edition of Holtzmann in 1897 the whole position of New Testament theology has become different. The labors of many scholars in widely diverse fields of Biblical research have not only

accumulated fresh data for answering the various problems, but have compelled, in almost every instance, a new statement of the problem itself.

1. Documents external to the New Testament but illustrative of its thought and beliefs have been more carefully examined. (a) The apocalyptic literature has received closer attention. Its sources, purpose and character are far better understood than they were twenty years ago; and its influence on early Christian ideas has been investigated in detail. The results of this study alone, though on some cardinal points they are still far from certain, have been little short of revolutionary. (b) Rabbinical literature has become more accessible, and in the light of it we are better able to appreciate certain aspects of New Testament thought. One of the most hopeful signs of recent years has been the increasing willingness of Jewish and Christian scholars to co-operate. The Jewish Encyclopedia, the commentary on the Synoptic Gospels by Montefiore and Abrahams, the contributions of Schechter and others, have done much to correct and supplement our traditional ideas of the New Testament. (c) The interest in Philo has undergone a marked revival within the last few years. His works have been critically edited for the first time by Cohn and Wendland. Discussions like those of Bréhier and Windisch have enabled us to apprehend his thought more fairly. The whole question of Alexandrian speculation has been placed on a new footing by the discovery of Egyptian as well as Greek affinities in the system of Philo. (d) The influence of Greek, and especially Stoic, philosophy on the New Testament has long been recognized; but it is only of late years that the points of contact between Paul's Epistles and the Diatribe literature have been noted and investigated by Wendland, Bultmann, and others. It has thus become possible to estimate in a more accurate manner the relation of Paul's thinking to the current philosophy. (e) The researches of Deissmann and others have taught us how the New Testament writers were affected by the popular Hellenistic ideas. It may be that Deissmann has tried to prove too much from purely linguistic evidence, but there can be no question that the new data have cleared up many points of detail which were previously obscure. (f) An entirely

fresh light has been thrown on early Christian thought by the study of the Oriental mystery-religions, especially by Reitzenstein, Cumont, and Dieterich. This line of inquiry has only been opened up in recent years, and the conclusions which have been reached are of a more or less tentative character. Many scholars are perhaps disposed to make too much of the new discoveries, and to miss what is essential in Christian thought by reading everything in terms of the Oriental cults. But it can hardly be questioned that we have now learned to distinguish a new and important element which must be taken into account in all future expositions of the primitive theology.

2. The literary criticism of the New Testament has been notably advanced by the labors of the last ten or fifteen years; and a more accurate knowledge of the structure and origin of the various writings has helped to elucidate their teaching. In two cases, more especially, literary criticism has reacted on our study of the theology. (*a*) It would be too bold to persuade ourselves that the Synoptic problem is approaching anything like a final solution; but the different strata in the evangelic tradition have now been so far determined that the analysis of the teaching of Jesus may be based on certain definite principles. We can distinguish, with a confidence hitherto impossible, between the earliest records and the later interpretations. (*b*) The book of Acts has recovered something of its former significance. By our attitude to this book our view of the whole course of early Christianity must be largely determined; and, while such a position as that of Harnack in his later studies can hardly be maintained, it seems clear that Acts must now be taken seriously as an historical document. The analytical criticism of the introductory chapters (Harnack, Clemen, Jungst, and others) has been especially valuable, since it has established a strong probability that in his account of the most ancient period the author made use of sources which can still, in some measure, be recognized.

3. Separate aspects of New Testament thought have been very fully investigated in recent years; and not a few of the monographs have marked a real addition to our knowledge. It will be enough simply to mention the works of Heitmüller on the baptismal formula; of Gunkel and Volz on the Spirit; of A. See-

berg on the primitive confession; of Lietzmann and Fiebig on the Son of Man. In this connection, too, we may note the commentaries, many of them of quite exceptional value, which have appeared since the beginning of the century, such as J. Weiss on 1 Corinthians, Loisy on the Synoptic Gospels, Bousset on Revelation, Bacon on Mark and Galatians. Questions of exegesis have been so treated in many of these recent commentaries as to illuminate the larger theological problems.

On all sides, then, a great mass of fresh and valuable material has been collected for the writer on New Testament Theology. His task has in some ways been rendered more complex, but in others has been lightened and simplified. He can make use of well-made roads where his predecessors had to hew their own way through the jungle, and can advance to positive results without wasting his labor on mere controversy. It must indeed be admitted that the last few years have had their full share of wild theories, as well as of solid and fruitful work. Echoes are still heard of Van Manen's attack on the authenticity of Paul's Epistles. The old debate as to whether Jesus was an historical person has been revived in new forms. Attempts have been made to construe the early Christian movement by means of categories borrowed from modern Socialism. But these mere fire-works of criticism have already enjoyed the brief moment in which they have had time to spend themselves. They have served a useful purpose by bringing out into clearer relief the assured facts which have to be studied and interpreted.

It would be difficult to say which of the two books before us is the better done; and happily it is not necessary. Both of them are works of remarkable ability, thorough in their treatment, honest and fair-minded in their conclusions. Weinell's, it will be generally acknowledged, is the more brilliant and original book; Feine's is perhaps the more useful for the purposes of the student. By a fortunate accident the two books, which might have easily stood in mere rivalry, serve to complement each other and will be found equally necessary. While both writers are at pains to hold the balances even and to bring every question into the fullest modern light, Weinell reflects the opinions of the more ad-

vanced criticism, while Feine is more cautious, and prefers in case of doubt to fall back on orthodox positions. This will become apparent as we proceed to outline some of the more salient features of the two discussions.

Weinel¹ lays stress at the outset on the close relation between the thought and the life of the primitive church, and shows that the old conception of an abstract development of doctrine is misleading. Throughout his book—and this perhaps is its chief excellence—he tries to make us feel that Christian thinking in the first century was only the other side of Christian history and experience. His first care is to define the specific character of Christianity as distinguished from the religions amidst which it arose, and which, in some cases, superficially resembled it. It was a religion of redemption, unlike the moral-ceremonial religion of Judaism. At the same time it was not an aesthetic redemptive religion, like the Oriental cults; that is, it did not aim at deliverance merely from the sense of suffering and earthly limitation. It was an ethical-redemptive religion, seeking its goal in the deliverance from moral unworthiness. From this point of view Weincl discusses the teaching of Jesus. He fully admits the apocalyptic framework of the teaching, but shows that its true affinities were with Old Testament prophecy. Jesus was concerned, not so much with the Kingdom itself as with the conditions on which men might enter it; and these conditions were of a moral nature. Mysticism had no place in the thought of Jesus, and his seeming asceticism was in reality a demand for sacrifice. On the basis of the apocalyptic idea of the Kingdom he perfected the ethical religion, insisting on obedience to the will of God, and separating that will from everything that is not morally good and holy. The fundamental idea of a life according to the will of God brought with it a new conception of God and of man's relation to him. God is at once absolute Lord and absolute goodness; and by faith in him man is regenerated, that is, made capable of a new moral life, depending on new impulses. As in the aesthetic religions man is redeemed from natural limitations, so in the religion of Jesus he is redeemed from moral impotence and failure,

¹ *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, von H. Weincl. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr. 1911. pp. 603.

and receives power for doing and willing what is good. These points are all elaborated and illustrated by Weinel in a section which occupies about a third of his book, and in which his special qualities of vivid presentation and fresh perception can be seen at their best. He has done valuable service in asserting once more those great religious and moral elements of Jesus' teaching which a pedantic criticism would resolve into mere by-products of an apocalyptic message. At the same time he has not tried to make sufficiently clear the nexus between the apocalyptic and ethical sides of the teaching. In the closing chapters of the section he deals with Jesus' conception of his own person and office; and here again the treatment is somewhat inconclusive. Jesus accepted his Messianic vocation as a prophetic one. It is probable that he conceived of himself as in some peculiar sense the Son of God; probable also that when he spoke of the coming of the Son of Man, he thought of his own return in glory. But he claimed to be Messiah primarily because he brought to men the true knowledge of God and realized the Fatherly will of God in his own life. Though he recognizes the substantial authenticity of the accounts of the Last Supper, Weinel refuses to admit any idea of an atonement in the thought of Jesus.

After a chapter on the primitive community (which to our mind is too brief and inadequate), Weinel passes to Paul, from the canon of whose writings he excludes Ephesians and Colossians as well as the Pastorals. With Paul Christianity becomes subjective and psychological, an interpretation of the Apostle's own experience rather than an objective message. This is the chief difference between Paul and Jesus, though essentially they are far more closely related than is generally supposed. Paul was fully acquainted with the teaching of Jesus. Like him he insisted on an ethical redemption, and pierced the shell of the Law in order to reach the unity of an ideal. But while he grasped the true meaning of Jesus' teaching, he read it through his own experience and presented it in his own way.

What Paul seeks from religion is, above all, *power*—power to overcome not only moral hindrances, but the intrinsic weakness of the flesh and the dominion of evil spirits. The doctrine of Justification, therefore, is not the whole of Paulinism. Along

with the "righteousness of God," Paul aims at obtaining a redemption which is dynamical and metaphysical in its nature. The death of Christ is invested with a cosmical significance. It effects the overthrow of the powers hostile to man, in addition to its worth as an atoning sacrifice. Weinel is surely on doubtful ground when he seeks to explain the doctrine of the Atonement by Jewish sacrificial ideas. He puts the whole doctrine, however, in a clearer light by his proof that with Paul the guiding principle of the atonement is the love of God, not his honor or justice or holiness, as in the later theology.

The most suggestive part of the Pauline section is that which treats of Paul's mysticism. Weinel traces this element of the Apostle's thinking to three roots: the mystery-religions; the manifestations of the Spirit in the community; Paul's own experience of Christ. These influences all worked together, and it is wrong to emphasize any one of them to the exclusion of the others. The mystical side of Paulinism is regarded by Weinel as a sort of other religion, parallel to the redemption-religion, but never wholly identified with it. So far, indeed, as Paul relates his mysticism to the sacraments, he falls back on a type of religion which had no real place in Christianity. At the same time, his mysticism is ultimately independent of the sacraments, which only serve to focus for him the results of spiritual experience. In his account of Paul's Christology, Weinel assigns an altogether subordinate place to Jewish Messianic speculation. For the most part Paul thinks of Christ as the Heavenly Man; while at times he seems to conceive of him after the analogy of the mystery-gods, or as one with the Holy Spirit.

The theology subsequent to Paul is treated as a single whole, under the rubric of "The Christianity of the developing Church." This method of treatment has no doubt certain advantages. It brings to light the points of connection between the different theological forces which were working towards the catholicism of the second century; the later writings of the New Testament are made to illustrate one another, and stress is laid on the essential features of the development rather than on mere side-issues. But we are inclined to question the wisdom of the new arrangement. It is true that Ephesians, Hebrews, and the Fourth Gospel

all represent phases of a single movement, but each of them has an individuality which is blurred in the composite picture set before us by Weinl. To understand his view, say of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we require to turn to seven or eight different sections (Apologetic, Ethics, Mysticism, etc.), and piece together the references to the given writing. Even then, they are disconnected, and the relation, often so suggestive, of ethics to doctrine, ecclesiastical thought to mysticism, falls out of sight. The fault is hardly remedied by the rather clumsy device of an appendix in which the main conceptions of the various books are brought together in brief outline.

In this last part of his work, Weinl shows how sub-Pauline Christianity was moulded by historical conditions—the spread of the new religion among the proletariat of the great cities, the infiltration of Pagan and philosophical ideas, the strengthening of the church as an institution. The Jewish Christians divided into three parties, represented by Peter, James, and the extreme Judaists. Paulinism likewise took three directions: (a) Paul himself, who never absolutely broke with Judaism; (b) his heathen converts, whose anti-Jewish attitude we can discern in the Epistle to the Romans; (c) the radical, or Gnostic, sectaries. These various tendencies, by their conflict and interaction, produced catholic Christianity. Gnostic rationalism and the eschatological hope were both intensified; sacramental ideas became prominent; the Pauline doctrine of grace was maintained, but works were allowed a value alongside of grace. In the Johannine writings (i.e. the Gospel and the First Epistle) the Christ-mysticism of Paul merges in a God-mysticism, which is rendered possible by a new conception of God, peculiar to this writer. The simplicity of personal faith in God is transcended, and God is conceived under abstract categories as Spirit, Love, Light. Apocalyptic hopes are transformed into their inward and spiritual equivalents; and through the influence of mystical ideas, the Pauline certainty of salvation becomes metaphysical. In John, as in Paul, mysticism allies itself with sacramental doctrine, but with him also it is ultimately independent—the substance to which the sacraments supply a form. Weinl's account of the Johannine theology, though exceedingly fresh and able, is spoiled by the fault

of arrangement which we have already noted. The Fourth Gospel, more than any other New Testament writing, reflects a variety of interests, which are yet blended together harmoniously. When the ethical, polemical, ecclesiastical, philosophical, and mystical sides of its teaching are all detached from one another, we are apt to miss the peculiar essence which belongs to the Gospel as a whole.

The work of Feine² is mapped out according to the old divisions: the teaching of Jesus, the beliefs of the primitive community, Paul, the sub-Pauline writings taken one by one, the Johannine theology. Ephesians and Colossians are given to Paul, and even the question of the Pastorals is left open. It is considered probable that the Apocalypse is by the same author as the Gospel and Epistles of John, although due weight is allowed to arguments on the other side. About half of the large volume is allotted to the theology of Paul; and this, which is the most elaborate, is also, to our mind, the most valuable section of the book. The exposition of the teaching of Jesus is full and thorough, and like all the other sections is admirably clear in its summary of modern results; but we miss the vividness and penetration of Weinel. There is too much of an attempt to classify the ideas of Jesus according to a theological scheme, and their living and creative power is left unexplained.

As the guiding principle in his whole presentation, Feine takes the idea of the Messianic consciousness. Jesus claimed to be the Messiah, intrusted by God with the execution of his saving purposes, and on this claim all his teaching centred. The first disciples accepted the testimony of Jesus to himself, and verified it by religious experience. Paul interpreted this experience and brought it under theological conceptions, while John realized it in its fulness by finding in Jesus the absolute revelation of God. Now it may be granted that Jesus' consciousness of a unique relation to the Father was the ultimate basis and sanction of all his work; and in this sense the construction of Feine may be justified. But there can surely be little doubt that the Kingdom was the primary theme of his teaching, and that the claim to

²Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Von Paul Feine. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1910. pp. 714. 2te Auflage, 1911.

Messiahship grew out of his reflection on his own significance for the Kingdom. In reading the book generally, and the first section in particular, we have an uneasy feeling that the whole structure is made to rest on its apex.

Feine allows for a considerable development in the thought of the church before the appearance of Paul. He believes that the influence of the Jewish controversy on Paul has often been overrated. Paul's doctrine was fixed in its main outlines before the controversy began, and was essentially the doctrine of the church from the beginning. Paul himself, though the first Christian theologian, was not a systematic thinker. Parts of his teaching were worked out with comparative fulness; parts were merely sketched, and were not brought into harmony with the main body of his thought. In fact, we are to regard Paulinism as a mosaic of doctrine, although it is also true that the whole is suggested by each part.

Feine examines with care and impartiality the various attempts to deduce the Pauline teaching from Jewish eschatology, Stoic speculation, Oriental Gnosis. To such views of its origin he concedes this much of truth, that Paul endeavored to express his doctrines, and even his most vital doctrines, in terms of contemporary thought. But he insists that the one true method is to start from Paul's religious experience. He clothes the revelation that came to him through Christ in forms provided for him by the thought of the age, not *vice versa*. Even in his Christ-mysticism he did not borrow anything essential from the Oriental cults, for none of these knew of an historical person, with a moral and religious significance. The two roots, then, of Paul's theology were (1) the self-witness of Jesus, (2) his own religious experience, especially that of his conversion. Paulinism cannot be understood except as the theological presentation of the historical fact of Jesus. What the age was longing for and striving to express in its myths and philosophies had for Paul become a reality.

In the doctrine of Justification the Pauline teaching finds its centre. Justification, indeed, is for Paul the whole of salvation; and we pervert his thought when we distinguish other processes supplementary to it. The man whom God has justified is also

actively righteous; he receives a new power, and is filled with the desire to attain to the highest moral ideal. In his statement of the doctrine Paul employs a Jewish conception, but entirely changes its content; and in like manner he deals with faith. In Judaism, faith was a work of merit; with Paul it consists in the willingness to receive God's grace, and even this willingness is wrought in men by God. Feine lays just emphasis on the idea, cardinal to Paul, that God always takes the initiative. Man is reconciled to God, not God to man; but the desire and capacity for reconciliation must be the work of God in a man's heart. Paul's whole teaching is based on this conception that everything is given by God, of his own free grace.

The mystical side of Paulinism is inadequately treated, and this is true likewise of the doctrine of the Spirit, which is so closely allied to it. Feine is over-anxious to maintain his thesis that Paul's one interest is in the moral and religious renewal effected by Christ. He acknowledges that the Spirit, in accordance with the thought of the time, is conceived semi-physically, and is supposed to work a change in man's nature as well as in his will. But he insists that all the time Paul is seeking to subordinate the natural to the moral categories. The affinities of Pauline thought with Gnosticism are barely recognized.

Before passing to the Johannine theology, Feine carefully reviews the intermediate writings; and his conclusions on most of them will be generally accepted, although he is apt to offer compromises which are not altogether happy. He grants, for instance, that first Peter is a sub-Pauline document, in which the teaching of Paul is diluted with popular ideas and used for the support of ethical exhortation. But he argues for the authority of Peter behind the Epistle, and concludes that Silvanus probably wrote it from hints which Peter supplied. In the chapter on the Apocalypse an admirable exposition is in some measure vitiated by the forlorn attempt to force the book into harmony with the Fourth Gospel. When he comes to the Fourth Gospel itself, Feine's attitude to the critical question is conservative, but he accepts in substance the modern view of the theology. John interprets the Synoptic picture of the life of Jesus through the medium of Pauline doctrine. He transcends the primitive escha-

tology, though in deference to the teaching of the church he makes occasional concessions to it which are inconsistent with his own thought. The Christology of the Prologue is that of the whole Gospel, and is based on the Logos-theory of Philo; yet the Gospel is something else than a history of the Logos. John fills the Philonic idea with a new content, and employs it in order that he may set forth in clear relief the divine character of the Person and work of Jesus. The conception of the Logos is blended throughout with that of Life, which, according to Feine, must be understood in a religious, not in a metaphysical or seminatural sense. Jesus, by the revelation of himself, brings us into a living fellowship with God.

In this brief sketch it has been possible only to indicate a few of the more characteristic features of the two presentations. As was inevitable, the writers differ continually, not only in their mode of treatment, but in their estimates and conclusions. More striking, however, than the differences are the many elements of agreement in these two works, written from points of view which we have been used to think of as conflicting. There seems good reason to believe that conservative and radical scholars are gradually throwing off their old attitude of mere antagonism. They are beginning to realize that, although they have set out from opposite sides, they are working towards the same goal and will finally shake hands.

Apart from numberless agreements in points of detail, we may note several of the broader lines of approximation which are revealed in the two books before us. (1) It is no longer denied that even the earliest Christianity was in some measure composite. Feine is no less willing than Weinel to allow for the influence of contemporary movements in philosophy and religion. He grants that the permanent message of the gospel was expressed in forms that were borrowed from the age, and requires, in some measure, to be disengaged from them. (2) These alien influences are coming to be recognized as secondary. For a long time yet we may have to reckon with theories that Paulinism was nothing but a Jewish or Oriental theosophy, that the Fourth Gospel was a belated Philonic treatise, that Jesus himself was concerned wholly

with the apocalyptic hope. But these extreme views are becoming less and less tenable, and the essential originality of the Christian movement is steadily asserting itself. Now that the first flush of discovery is over, the new factors which were supposed to explain everything are subsiding into their place. Due weight must always be assigned to them, but the New Testament scholar has to reach beyond them to that which was native and specific in Christian thought. (3) The theory of sharp antagonisms among the early teachers of the church has now been abandoned. Some conflict there undoubtedly was, but we are learning to realize that the different parties were far closer to one another than was formerly supposed. Instead of a development through strife, there was an orderly progress, due partly to the operation of new influences, and partly to the gradual unfolding of ideas that had been present from the beginning. (4) As to the general course which the progress followed, there is now little difference of opinion. It is admitted that after the death of Paul his ideas were combined with others of a more popular character. It is admitted, likewise, that the Fourth Gospel, whatever may have been its origin, presupposes the theology of Paul. In spite of many obscurities in matters of detail, the broad stages of the development are so well ascertained that New Testament doctrine can now be treated historically.

But while the comparison of these two books affords evidence of results now practically assured, it also reminds us of the many questions which still await a further investigation. It will be enough to mention only a few of the more important. (1) All scholars are now agreed that the thought of Jesus contained a large apocalyptic element, but we have still to determine its precise nature and extent. Above all, the relation of the apocalyptic to the moral and religious aspects of the teaching is altogether uncertain. (2) The beliefs of the earliest community and their connection with Jesus' message of the Kingdom have never been adequately examined. In the two books before us, just as in the older works, the primitive theology is treated in a meagre and perfunctory fashion. We are left with the impression that between Jesus and Paul there was a confused interval, in which the new religion was in danger of narrowing down into a mere sect of

Judaism. It can hardly be doubted, however, that this interval, of which we know so little, was the true formative period of Christian thought and belief. A closer analysis of the data, scanty and uncertain as they are, may yet reveal to us the line of continuity from the teaching of Jesus to that of Paul and the later church. (3) The whole subject of Paulinism is full of unsolved problems. It may be granted that the old conception of Paul as a systematic thinker was a mistaken one; but the modern account of his theology as a mosaic of disconnected fragments is even more unsatisfying. One cannot but feel that the true key to Paulinism has yet to be discovered. The apparent contradictions which it presents to us are due to our ignorance quite as much as to any want of system and cohesion in the Apostle's own thought. (4) The doctrine of the Spirit requires to be considered more fully, in its many-sided bearing on the life and theology of the early church. It is only in recent years that an intelligent study of this doctrine has become possible; and our understanding of it is still very far from adequate. Its background in Jewish, Oriental, and philosophical thought has only been partially determined, and the course of its development within the New Testament itself has never been traced out with sufficient thoroughness. Why did the idea of the Spirit assume such prominence in the early community? How far and in what sense was it derived from Jesus himself? Through what changes did it pass in its elaboration by Paul and the Fourth Evangelist? How was it related to the doctrines of baptism, the church, the new life? These questions have not yet been really answered, and they are vital to the whole theology of the New Testament. (5) A more careful inquiry must be made into the history of apocalyptic ideas in the early church. At present we are unable to determine whether the apocalyptic hope became stronger or weaker after Jesus' death; whether the evangelists, in deference to later feeling, have toned down this side of his message or exaggerated it. We cannot say how far the life of the church was controlled by eschatological and how far by purely moral and spiritual motives. The merging of apocalyptic in mystical thought, as we find it in the Fourth Gospel, has never been fully explained. (6) The great Christological problem still baffles us

—indeed it has become more difficult than ever. Modern investigation has all tended to make it certain that the divinizing of Jesus began much earlier than the criticism of the last century would allow. The process was already completed, as Weinel is willing to admit, in the lifetime of Paul. How are we to account for this estimate of Jesus, which overstepped the Messianic categories almost from the beginning? These are only a few of the more outstanding questions that are now pressing for a solution; and, apart from these, almost every book of the New Testament offers its own peculiar problems. In the case of many of the writings theological and critical difficulties are bound up together. The critical analysis must be carried a good deal further before any treatment of the theology can be other than provisional.

As yet, therefore, we have by no means reached the end in the investigation of New Testament thought. The field at first sight appears a narrow one, and multitudes of scholars have been working in it diligently for a hundred years; but all the progress has only served to reveal the largeness and complexity of the task. We were ready to believe at the close of the last century that at least the main positions had been securely established, and ever since then materials have been accumulating which have compelled us to build afresh. A dozen years ago the apocalyptic groundwork of Jesus' teaching was barely suspected; the influence of the Oriental cults on Paulinism was hardly dreamed of. These two factors, so recently discovered, have changed the whole current of New Testament inquiry; and who can doubt that others, no less significant, will yet come to light? It will be long before the final exposition of New Testament theology can be written; but meanwhile we are thankful for books so excellent as those which have been reviewed. They summarize with admirable clearness and fairness the latest results of scholarship, and define the points of departure for a fresh advance.

THE REINSTATEMENT OF TELEOLOGY

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The question about the whence and whither of the drift of our cosmic weather is an old one and cannot be lightly brushed aside. It is both a forced and a momentous issue. It is a forced issue, because we cannot help taking an attitude towards it, whether we make it explicit to ourselves or not. It is momentous, because such an attitude is a serious index of our deepest practical faith as regards the value of life, and cannot help determining our conduct. There have been three distinct types of theory in the past as regards this drift—Mechanism, Finalism, and Vitalism.

I. THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

1. *Mechanism.* In considering mechanism, we must be careful not to be misled by the name, which is after all but a figure of speech. The view of the scientific naturalist of today has little in common with the mechanical theory of the eighteenth century. His interest, as must always be the case with science, is in efficient causes, and in so far he is not committed to any special type of metaphysics. He is but trying to discover the determining factors in the series of dynamic situations which occur in experience. As regards the constitution of these situations he is not necessarily an abstract atomist. It is true that the atomic hypothesis in chemistry and Mendel's theory of unit characters in biology have proved highly convenient in studying chemical and biological processes, but recent scientific research has shown that such an atomism, if taken in the abstract, breaks down. The Mendelian units, for example, are not effective as abstract elements. They figure within dynamic situations which they enable us to predict. Sometimes two unit-characters may figure as one for the purpose of prediction. In any case we must take account of the dynamic context in order to have satisfactory explanation.

This is equally true of other biological abstractions, such as sex determinants. They are, after all, abstractions, and only efficient in the situations in which they figure and which we cannot afford to ignore. The mechanical view, in the science of the present day, amounts to this, that in the case of life as well as in the inorganic world we must examine the chemical constitution of the process. We must analyze the dynamic situation into its chemical factors and their positional values. The effects of the presence and absence of these factors must be discovered, their quantitative variations in the situations under experimental control must be studied, and the effects of external conditions noted. There is no metaphysical short cut to an understanding of the process of life, any more than to an understanding of other dynamic processes.

As for the unique chemical compounds which pertain to living organisms, natural science, accepting them as facts as it accepts other actual compounds, is inclined to assume continuity as between the organic and inorganic, and to reduce the difference to one of complexity. The chemist's success in artificially producing "organic" substances in the laboratory—a success which has been ever increasing since the organic compound of urea was artificially produced a century or more ago—has stimulated the naturalist to believe that it may hereafter be possible to produce living protoplasm out of what we call inorganic elements, or at any rate that our failure to do so in the past is due to our ignorance and not to any inherent absurdity in the idea.

Now if the attitude of mechanism be understood in this naturalistic sense, nothing can be said against its procedure. Its results in successful prediction have been truly marvellous, considering the short time for which the method has been seriously tried. The revising of special hypotheses must be dictated by the facts, not by any *a priori* objections. Thus it is now generally recognized that the Darwinian hypothesis of natural selection, epoch-making as it was and useful as it still is, is only a partial account of the facts. Natural selection is a negative factor in evolution. As Driesch puts it, to regard natural selection "as a positive factor in descent would be to confound the sufficient reason for the non-existence of what is not with the sufficient reason of what is."¹

¹ See *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, VII, 321.

The positive ground for variation and continuity must be found within the process.

The only question that can be raised as to the mechanistic hypothesis is whether it is adequate as an ultimate philosophy. Can this external and seemingly blind dynamism which appears in inorganic nature account for the direction of the process, and for the outcome as we find it in the higher stages of life? Can we read the whole history of the universe solely in terms of the categories which have proved so convenient on the simpler levels of existence? The postulate of continuity should apply, it would seem, as well when read from above down as when read from below up. And, after all, we have a much more intimate knowledge of processes and their implications in the highest stages, of which our will and ideals are a part, than we can ever possess of the dynamism of the lower stages of nature. In the former case we have a first-hand acquaintance with the inner transitions and unities; in the latter we are at best outside and speculative spectators.

2. *Finalism.* Finalism, as opposed to mechanism, has always taken the point of view that we must judge evolution by its outcome, its last stages. We know the potentialities of the acorn when we have seen it grow up as the oak, of the child when its capacities are displayed in the grown man. So we must know nature by its outcome in our own striving for ideals. Under the theory of mechanism, the process is accounted for by the factors discoverable in the previous stage of the sequence, together with the external conditions which play upon them; for finalism the causality lies in the future, in the prospective value of the process.

For working out this view we must go back to Plato and Aristotle as models. In opposition to the naturalistic method of their day, they insisted that evolution must be explained by its purpose, the idea, or form, to which it tends. The two Greek thinkers differ somewhat in details, but Plato must be regarded as the original master of this type of view.

For Plato the world of sense, the existence of which he does not deny, is but a poor effort to copy a world of eternal ideas. These alone are real. On this theory of a copy, Plato is driven to assume

that there are as many ideas not only as there are ideals and class-types, but as there are individuals and types of relations. This forces him eventually to regard mathematics as the type of the real, since only here can he find ideal possibilities adequate to the originals of the distorted shadows which make up the phenomenal world. With this phenomenal world Plato manifests a poetic impatience. He would not trouble himself with the mechanism of movement, so important to Aristotle. He would go directly to the end, which is the Good. Aristotle, while he largely copies his master, places more confidence in the world of actual process, in the potentialities of matter. The concrete process is the first reality. But this process finds its explanation in the conception of a goal to which it tends, its final cause. Here shows the artistic consciousness of the Greek; life and nature, too, work as the artist. In either of these views the end is conceived as the moving cause.

But obviously the end cannot be conceived to be consciously present in the case of the lower processes. How can they then develop in the direction of their characteristic activities? In other words, how can the form be effective? Since God is the goal and final cause of the movement of the universe, how does God act upon the world? Here Aristotle wavers between two methods. He sometimes speaks in quite mechanical terms. God gives a push from without to the outer circle of the universe, and thus makes it move. But the more characteristic method of Aristotle is to look upon God as self-contained activity and bliss, moving the world by his perfection. The beloved does not need to do anything to the lover; for the lover is moved by the beauty of the beloved. So the universe moves because it desires perfection. This perfection, moreover, is different for different classes; vegetable, animal, or human, each moves to realize its own proper function, its characteristic soul.

Hence it is necessary, in order to explain the diversity of the process, to assume in addition to God a multiplicity of forms,—entelechies, or conceptions. Just what relation these bear to the final form, God, Aristotle does not tell us; he takes them for granted from experience. His faith in the concrete process, however, gives him the advantage that he can regard the process

itself as really moving, and also that he can make this concrete process bear part of the responsibility. Thus the individuality of the process is due not to its form but to its matter. Hence forms are genera, not particulars. Here again his solution of the problem is tantalizingly vague. And naturally he has little to say about immortality, that is, the final significance of the individual.

A more serious question is why the process should desire the form. What relation do the conceptions, or entelechies, bear to the process itself? If they did not exist as second realities, would it make any difference to the process? Would not the process move by its own immanent tendency? In that case the conceptions, serving as final causes, would seem to be after-thoughts. But Aristotle is too anthropomorphic to be troubled by such questions; for him to the end it is the conceptions which move matter, although "only the master-workers know the reason why. Manual workers, like lifeless things, work by habit."

That there is truth in the finalist's contention we shall find abundant reason to see. But the solution suggested by Plato and Aristotle is far too easy and abstract. A biologist of the present day, Driesch, has attempted to give Aristotle's view a more modern and scientific statement. Driesch insists that we cannot account for the prospective value of the parts of protoplasm, as shown especially in restitution and heredity, unless we introduce entelechies. "An entelechy means the faculty of achieving '*forma essentialis*.'" Now these entelechies, while figuring in the process, are not on the one hand psychological entities, nor on the other are they energies. They can, however, be best understood from psychological analogies. They are selective. They perform functions which resemble judging and liking, willing and thinking. Yet, while they are not energies, they can under certain conditions suspend the energetic reactions; and they have a regulative function in the process. But while Driesch's attempt to get away from the anthropomorphism of Aristotle is commendable, it must be said that Aristotle's final causes are at least intelligible, being drawn from our experience of certain processes where they do hold. Driesch's entelechies seem to have no meaning at all; they are merely duplicates of the selective and

prospective tendencies of the process. Moreover, such a selective function is by no means limited to the organic realm; we find it, though with less complicated working, in the chemical affinities. In any case, it is hard to see what we have gained by hypostatizing such tendencies and giving them a Greek name.

3. *Vitalism*. Mechanism and classical finalism deal with partial aspects of the processes. Vitalism attempts to find a common denominator for the process as a whole.

Bergson and others have pointed out with great clearness that the correlative growth of organs and functions in organic life, for example in the eye, could not be accounted for by mere accidental variations and natural selection. If in any one part such variations were considerable and abrupt, as in the case of mutations, they would only interfere the more with the functioning of the organ. If they were small they might not interfere, but they would have to accumulate through ages, and correlative changes in this and other organs would have to take place, so as to produce harmonious adjustment or adaptive functioning. This is almost impossible to conceive on the basis of chance.

So with the different directions in which evolution has proceeded. These directions must be implied in the process, even though we can only read them backwards, as at sea we read the direction of the ship's movement from the silver wake where we have passed.

As between mechanism and conceptional finalism Bergson suggests the middle ground of *vital impulse*, in which is implied the complexity that afterwards appears when evolution splits up in the struggle with the environment, as the potential effects of the sky-rocket appear when it bursts in the air. The most important of these tendencies are the split of life into the vegetable and animal and the dissociation of mind into instinct and intelligence. Evolution is division. In the division, however, there remains a suggestion of the other side; some common characters, however secondary, abide. Plant-life carries a blend of the animal; intelligence, a blend of instinct. The progress and continuity of the process are to be accounted for by the push from behind of the common vital impulse.

Whether this vital impulse, as a distinct determinant in the

evolution of life, must be added to the chemical determinants with which naturalism deals, must be decided by scientific evidence. Once admit creative evolution in general, and recognize in particular that every compound must be regarded as a creative result, possessing a new and unique set of reactions, and not a mere addition of the separately known characters of the elements which enter into it, and the conceptual difficulty disappears. Whether, as externally viewed, life itself can be regarded as a compound, or whether, to produce in life some new factor must be supposed to have been added from without, must be decided upon evidence. At present the difficulties of conceiving that life was introduced from outside into our planet seem at least as great as those of the theory that it arose from certain antecedent conditions on our planet. In any case, we are dealing essentially with mechanism. Vital impulse, as pictured by Bergson, is no less blind than the elements of chemistry. Its structure, in order to account for all the diversity of life, must be no less atomic than science has pictured the physical structure to be. Moreover, synthesis would seem to be as characteristic of evolution as division; and if so, why may not life itself be regarded as a new synthesis, under specific conditions, in the creative process?

The trouble with the vital impulse is that, like any conception which tries to explain everything, it explains nothing. We still have the diversity of the process, with its direction, to account for. To say that what does happen can happen, is self-evident; and that is all that vitalism tells us. In trying to explain everything from below, the higher from the more primitive, it is pragmatically indistinguishable from the naturalistic mechanism which it condemns. The latter at least furnishes the only empirically fruitful method of investigating the apparent sequences of life. To account for the direction or meaning of the process we must have something besides a blind *vis a tergo*. What this means we must presently see more in detail.

It is at least infinitely improbable that mere chance or mere external conjunction, whether in terms of vitalism or of chemical mechanism, should have accomplished the results of organization, with the compensatory adjustments involved in the evolution of life and mind. There must be some continuity which

enables us to read down from the higher as well as read up from the lower.

It is also unlikely that *all* life is a compound having the potentiality of the development of the higher forms with their awakening ideals. It is easier to suppose that life, as Maxwell supposes in regard to matter, has its omniscient sorting demon who interpenetrates and selects in accordance with certain standards. In other words, the natural order must be thought of as interpenetrated by an intelligent order. Aristotle's failure to make form (in the sense of ideal conceptions) effective, and his recourse to mechanical push to move the universe, should show us that form, in order to be efficient, must dip into the dynamic process itself, whether in a personal or impersonal way. In the plastic responsiveness of the natural order to this, the unseen order, would in that case lie its capacity for progress. This plasticity becomes more and more apparent in the higher orders of life with their vast complexity of possibilities and their organization for action. The nervous system is peculiarly the type of plastic responsiveness both to the unseen order which overarches and permeates and to the sense-order which establishes the immediate conditions of survival.

II. A NEW TELEOLOGY SUGGESTED

We have little sympathy today with Plato's "heavenly pattern" and Aristotle's "final causes," that is, with ideal conceptions as determining existence and survival. We are apt to think of the process of evolution as blindly accomplishing its course as a result of internal and external accidents. At best, some would say, it is only in retrospect that nature finds that some ways of doing things seem good and so strives to preserve them. Mind itself, with its ideals, some have come to treat in this retrospective way. And any emphasis on ideals has been promptly treated as an hypostasis of our own abstractions. Chance variation is regarded as the mother of mind and form, ideals are but indications of the drift, not its cause.

Even on this materialistic view, some use may be found for the "final form" of Aristotle. It represents, at any rate, the way

we look back upon the series after its conclusion. Ideals and types, as our measures, form *a posteriori* a convenient instrument for viewing the flux, and furnish a certain subjective satisfaction. But can we stop here? Is the type, the "final form," a mere result of accident? Could the direction of the organic process, or of social ideals, have been the opposite, if accident had so decreed? Is there no objective way of reading the series? Does it appear as it does simply because we happen to be at this end of it? And when life repeats itself, with seemingly new efforts to reproduce a type, is this sufficiently accounted for by accident? Could thought have been constituted entirely otherwise? Is the whole story of life, from the chaotic protoplasm from which it started to the striving for truth and beauty, all a matter of blind variations operated on by a blind environment?

However fully such a picture may do justice to our ignorance, it yet does not satisfy our reason. From the point of view of reason it is easier to read nature as striving to express certain types or ideals than to read ideals as chance. Nature seems to be, somehow, leading in the direction of human nature; the striving for a type somehow to be determining the direction of the series; and freedom and significant expression of life to be all the time the end to be realized.

I admit the difficulty of making this clear. But as a faith it ought to have at any rate the same opportunity as the materialistic faith in blind chance. If in our ignorance it makes the transitions of the facts easier for us, that gives it a pragmatic advantage over the more shocking rival faith. And I must confess that to me the conclusion of a process in the appreciation of truth and beauty is more reasonably accounted for in a universe which has a fundamental formal character and, as such, is selective than in a universe in which this idealization is an accident. On such reasonableness we may finally have to rest our mode of understanding the significance of evolution. Some may call this a mere temperamental preference. In that case the temperament remains to be accounted for. To me this seems like a fundamental demand for coherence and unity, while chance, formless happening, is fundamentally irrational—an apotheosis of our ignorance of the *modus operandi* of nature.

Whether the final cause operates through the inner yearning of the process for its type, its final realization, or whether the efficiency of the final cause means the operation in the universe of an ideal will, after the analogy of the artist, interpenetrating our finite world of process, selecting and rejecting with reference to the realization of the type—star type or man type—must again be decided by our experience, fragmentary as this is. Different ages and minds find one or the other of these attitudes more congenial. In any case the form would in some sense pre-exist in the process; and in any case evolution would mean the differentiation of the organs for the proper realization of this form and, in man at least, for the significant sharing of it.

The ultimate theory of evolution must include both mechanism and finalism. For the time being, in predicting and controlling the process, we must work by efficient causes. Science has no choice in this matter. On the other hand, we must admit that the ideal selection of the later stages has some continuity with the earlier stages. When we try to read the process in the large, at any rate, we must somehow recognize the direction within it. We may choose to ignore the final reason of things, and limit ourselves to the description of sequences; but it nevertheless remains true that in part of the process formal selection is a reality, and no fair account can be given of evolution without recognizing this part and its relation to the race. Invariable sequence, habit, recapitulation, and other external forms of linkage are but names for the facts. They merely indicate that facts do repeat themselves; they are not explanations. In some way the formal categories of which we become conscious in human nature must reveal to us the tendencies of nature; in some way the blossom on the tree of evolution must be indicative of the process which brought it into existence. The universe must be such as to account for the ideals which are a part of our experience as well as for the externality and blindness which we find. And as man in his small way, by his selection and emphasis of certain types of universe, is creative, so we must suppose that the process of which he is a part is likewise creative. This need not mean that the later stages are present bodily in the earlier, or that the earlier stages work by "conceptions," but it means that somehow the categories which

the later idealizing process brings to bear upon the earlier are germane to these earlier and not accidental.

Of the two conceptions, the mechanistic and the teleological, the latter is the one that overlaps. By means of laws familiar to us in the later purposive stages we can account for the automatism, the mechanism, the seeming deadness, of the world. By means of mechanism we cannot account for the seeming plasticity and value in parts of the process, at least not without falling back upon the miraculous, and so doing violence to our original concept. If we deny the reality of mind and ideals, we cannot account for the sense of promise of the world and of its openness toward the future, however convenient the conception of mechanism may be in epitomizing the past. In some way we must recognize emphasis and preferential selection, for human nature is part of nature.

That a universe should tend to realize a certain form is no more mysterious than that animals should turn toward or away from the light, or that the elements should attract or repel each other. In any case, in the last analysis we must fall back upon the constitution of reality as discovered in experience, and regard that as reasonable which works out. That a possibility of reasonableness should exist in a world which evolves reason seems certainly a reasonable demand.

It is the naturalistic materialist who has violated the principle of continuity in nature by cutting the higher stages of the process loose from the earlier. Why the materialist, who is always emphasizing continuity, should turn round when it comes to human nature and its ideals, and here insist upon discontinuity, a complete break, absolute irrelevance to what precedes, can be explained only as the result of prejudice. He had rather make any sacrifice than give up his faith in the adequacy of the mechanical method of reading the facts. If we would be fair, must we not insist that human nature, with the ideals which it brings to light, reveals truly and fundamentally the drift of nature? If we make nature responsible for evolution, then we must at any rate give nature full credit. We must keep in mind that thought, right, and beauty are as much expressions of nature as is the law of falling bodies. The whole history of evolution, including institutions,

science, and art, must be somehow prefigured in the nature of the universe as a whole. The after-form which we read in retrospect must somehow be foreshadowed in the process which terminates in it and which makes such reading possible. Consciousness but reveals, it does not make, the categories which guide mind in its higher activity.

Thus both the mechanical and the teleological categories must run through the various stages of evolution, however different their concrete richness and significance become with the varying complexity of the process. And this may be true irrespective of the stuff in which these categories express themselves. We have material mechanism and spiritual mechanism; and why not material teleology as well as spiritual teleology—just as the genius of the artist may express his meaning in marble, on canvas, in tones, or by means of words? The body is different, the limitations which the material sets are different, but the ideal laws are the same.

If we take even the categories of mechanism, we are most familiar with those which are expressed in terms of our own mental life, for memory and habit are categories of mechanism. As in the mechanical categories we can trace the identity between the higher processes of memory-association and the lower processes of perceptual habit and automatic activities, so we can trace the identity of the categories of external mental coherence with the categories of external coherence in the non-conscious world. Whether we use the term habit or some other term to indicate this universality of mechanism is a matter of convenience. If we cannot surely say, with C. S. Peirce, that matter is "mind hide-bound with habit," we can say that mechanism, in the sense of external determination, overlaps mind and matter, and has essentially the same categories in each.

On the analogy of memory, or rather by the use of categories which we must regard as identical and which are applicable both to the mechanism of memory and to the simpler forms of mechanism, we can account for, or at any rate throw light upon, processes which at first seem mysterious enough. In the case of memory, each part has by its position a certain function whereby it brings into the field of consciousness certain other parts. In other words,

the memory-mechanism is a constellation of mutually determining parts each able to restore other parts within the cluster. The mechanism is not absolute, there are minor fluctuations even in reproductive imagination; the situations are sufficiently identical for recognition with its feeling of familiarity, but new details have been added, old details have dropped out, and the tone of the situation may be greatly changed. In practical life we pass over these fluctuations as of no consequence to the process. In productive imagination, on the other hand, new types of universals are brought to light, which become permanent parts of our ideal activity.

In spite of the greater complexity of the process in the higher stages and the consciousness which accompanies it there, it is easy to see the fundamental identity of the operation of nature here with those operations which we find in the lower stages, such as heredity and the restitution (within greater or smaller limits) of parts. In each of these cases we have to do, whether in a material or mental way, with the positional value of a part within a constellation and its power to restore its context, whether this context be the space-context of a pattern of parts, simultaneously and mutually supplementing one another, or a time-context, where the parts blend into one another and constitute a sequential whole, as in the stages of the life of an organism or the movement of a melody. Some writers have called this positional potentiality of parts on the level of unconscious life organic memory. It is truer, however, to regard memory as a highly specialized form of the more universal tendency of reproduction of parts, with their fluctuations or mutations.

Thus it seems that certain mechanical categories are common to our minds and to the rest of reality. The preservation of a type, the tendency of one part to restore the rest of its complex, seems to be common to the mechanism of ideal and to that of lower activity. On the teleological side, too, we have reason to believe that there must be similar identity—elementary formal categories running through the process as a whole, whether inorganic, organic, or ideal selection—not limited to mind but present in some way, however unconscious, in the lower stages. There seems to be a tendency toward clearness and distinctness, toward

economy in relationships. That is why the fundamental postulate of simplicity has proved so convenient both in our theoretical and practical adjustments to our world.

That nature has, as it were, an aesthetic sense, that it operates so as to produce clearness and distinctness, is shown throughout its whole range of development. The inorganic world, as well as the organic, seems to respond to our ideal demands for simple formulation, for distinct types. Physical harmony follows the simplest ratios, as was pointed out by Helmholtz. The light rays move in straight lines, the chemical elements seem to fall into a "natural series," with relations that can be mathematically predicted. In the organic world nature likewise demands clearness and distinctness; the protean fluctuations fail to survive. Only the mutations, the distinct types, continue in heredity. Again, the mixture of species either gives rise to no offspring or produces sterility; or in the case of more approximate species a final reversion to the original type takes place in accordance with Mendel's law. Finally, in ideal creativeness and psychological heredity clearness and distinctness is the law. Here our conscious aim is to eliminate the irrelevant and make the type, or universal, stand out. Only the clear and distinct types succeed in becoming a permanent part of individual memory and social history. The infinite minor fluctuations come and go. We may therefore assume that the law which nature manifests in its highest creativeness and of which we are aware in our ideal production, namely, the law of clearness and distinctness, is identical with the law which governs nature throughout its various stages, and that the highest manifestations of this law differ from the lower primarily in the freedom and spontaneity with which the law realizes itself in the former. An immanent form in any case leads nature onward. While the law becomes conscious in the higher stages, it does not follow that it originates there. On the contrary it comes to our creative activity as a presupposition or command, as the voice of the universe.

This demand for clearness and distinctness in nature is seen even where there is mutation and instability. In a universal process the demand for clearness and distinctness necessarily

presents an infinite problem. In the case of the radio-active elements we seem to have such a case of mutation and instability in the natural series of elements. In the organic series periods of stability seem to alternate with periods of mutation. But in each case the spontaneity of nature illustrates the law or tendency which nature is ever striving to realize, and which is shown all the more strikingly because in places the process is still open and is striving for a new equilibrium.

Science, therefore, even of the most naturalistic kind postulates more than it knows, more than the blind mechanism with which it professes to work. It posits by its own faith and persistent effort, as it verifies by its success, that the universe must lend itself to ideals of simplicity and unity, that those laws which we discover for ourselves in the higher creative activities are relevant to our world, in brief that in a large sense the universe is fundamentally teleological. For us thus to strive to conquer the universe is part of the universe. The imperishable faith on the part of this piece of animated clay that, in spite of seeming defeat, it can yet make its demands prevail, that our will can in a measure reconstruct a world which shall be clear and distinct in its relationships in spite of seeming chaos—this faith is evidence of the voice of the universe, of its push toward ideal realization. By virtue of this, "hope springs eternal in the human breast." This faith is more fundamentally pious than our shortcuts by way of an anthropomorphic God. The trouble with so much of our thinking, both of the mechanical and teleological type, is that it has been truncated. It lacks thoroughness.

Geometry, mathematical simplification, is but this faith in clearness and distinctness reduced to its ultimate terms. It is the idealizing process in the abstract, outstripping, as it comes to consciousness in us, its concrete limitations. And so form appears as limit to our finite experience; yet, when you bring back this faith to our motley world, how convenient it proves, how well our world lends itself to it, irrespective of stuff, so as to make it seem that the universe "geometrizes"! And in a deep sense it does; for both the seemingly opaque world we strive to know and our thought are part and parcel of one process; in their formal pre-suppositions they are one. Nature owns and moulds mind into

its own requirements. If the processes in the universe, from the stellar movements to the harmonic relations of music and the minute relations in the structure of things, seek geometrical and arithmetical patterns, this is not because our thinking regulates the processes, but because in the laws of our thinking we discover the pure manifestations of the inherent form, not obscured by the concrete transitions and changes of process.

That, again, our conceptualizing should prove approximate is inevitable in a moving world. In such a world form must ever manifest itself as tendency or direction—as an ought. Absolute our ideal formulations could only prove in a world which had completely settled or encrusted itself. But such a universe would be dead. Process, transmutation, creativeness, is of the nature of reality and must be accepted as such. That nature is creative and not merely reproductive of ready-made universals is shown both on the plane of the unconscious origination of the lower levels of nature and on the plane of ideal creativeness. Organically, nature is ever creating and fixing new types; and in our ideal constructions this is no less true. If on the organic level nature is prodigal in her experiment, she is no less prodigal on the ideal level. How few poems, pictures, laws, practical plans, out of the myriads evolved, answer the permanent ideal demands of the race!

If nature stands in relation to its processes as an artist attempting to express a form—a form not foreign to itself but its own implicit or explicit constitution—then we must regard natural selection and artificial selection as part of the same activity, differing only in their degree of conscious direction and significance. The latter is itself a result of the demand for clearness and distinctness of functioning on the part of nature. In natural selection this formal demand realizes itself automatically in the flux of process. Just as the stone rolls back again to the bottom unless it reaches the top of the hill, so life tumbles back to the inchoate plane from which it tried to rise unless it reaches a clear and distinct type. On the level of thought, however, where nature is more or less clearly conscious of her aim, the process of so-called “artificial” selection is far more economical and efficient. Not only can ages of unconscious experimenting be

foreshortened, but results of clearness and distinctness can be attained which blind groping never could reach. And with it all, there is added, on this plane, the consciousness of value with its infinite richness.

It is not a case of natural laws in the spiritual world or of spiritual laws in the natural world, but of certain laws prevailing throughout the process of the universe, expressing themselves in the limitations of each particular stage and stuff in which they operate, just as the categories of art are fundamentally the same whether the stuff be marble, tone, or the body of language. What makes the law in each case clear is the interpenetration of the same identical form. The various energies are fundamentally run through with the same categories. It is a case of our reasonable reading of our world.

Two questions yet remain, namely, the character of this formal constitution and the question of its effectiveness in our world of process. Before taking up these questions, it is necessary to say a word about the internal conditions governing the continuity of process. For the present purpose, the elementary facts in the constitution of process may be considered as three: (1) the fluency of process, which makes it overflow our abstract types, producing ever new fluctuations and mutations; (2) the mechanical aspect of process which makes its flow crystallize, provisionally at least, into certain structures, making it possible to predict and control its flow; (3) the formal requirements which condition the direction and intelligibility of the process.

Coming back to our first question, How do forms pre-exist, or what forms are presupposed? I do not believe that it is necessary to assume an indefinite number of forms as do Plato and Aristotle. True, Aristotle limited the forms to class-forms and depended upon the concrete process to differentiate these into individuals. I would make the formal requirements still more general—the same for the process as a whole. These formal requirements, as I have shown, can be reduced in the last analysis to the demand for clearness and distinctness as regards the transitions and relations within the process. Variations, smaller or larger are ever produced; they tend to crystallize—to be retained and to reproduce their contexts by virtue of the inherent mechan-

ism of process. But they survive in the process, so far as internal conditions are concerned, only if they fulfil the formal requirements of clearness and distinctness. Neither the types nor the individuals are predetermined as such. But when in the course of the transmutations they do arise, they must, in order to survive, obey certain formal laws—laws which are also fundamental in our understanding and appreciation of our world.

Of course, besides the internal conditions of survival, there are the external conditions which fix what types can survive in the particular environment, simple or complex, low or high, as it may be. But these can only eliminate, they cannot make types permanent.

These external conditions cannot be conceived in merely material terms. There is more than one level of environment. If we take into account merely the simplest environment, the micro-organisms are better adapted to it than we are. They were here before us, and will remain for ages after the earth becomes uninhabitable for the higher forms of life. Some of them are adapted to withstand the temperature of liquid air.

There seem to be certain plateaus, levels or crusts of life, more or less rhythmically formed. These have their own unique conditions for survival. In social life we have certain levels in the way of custom and tradition; then there comes a loosening of the crust and a period of agitation and rearrangement. This in turn is followed by a new level of equilibrium with new selective conditions for the individual. The same seems to be true of life on the organic level. Here, too, periods of stability of species are found to alternate with periods of mutation. And thus new levels are reached with new external conditions for survival.

As regards the effectiveness of form, Plato and Aristotle have shown that in higher ideal realization it is not necessary that the form should itself move in order to produce movement, that is, that the form should possess energy. The beloved may be indifferent to the lover. Beauty moves us by its perfection, not by its sensuous body. What is true in the higher activities may be true of the lower. Substituting energy or tendency for love, we may say that energy seeks a geometrical or arithmetical pattern, seeks simplicity of relationships, though the limits

which it seeks do not act upon it. They are in fact part of its constitution. The laws of logic do not act upon the process of thought. They are implied in it. And thought is but nature's reflection upon itself.

III. MATTER AND GOD

In closing, something must be said about the metaphysical nature of the world in which form is realized. There has been in recent times much sentimental inveighing against the meanness and blindness of matter. Now that depends primarily upon definition. With some noble, rugged materialists the conception of matter is decidedly thick—rich in possibilities. Democritus, Hobbes, and Priestley deny nothing to matter that could make the world plausible. They attribute to matter all the pragmatic consequences with which experience makes us acquainted, including mind and ideals. With Democritus, while mind is reduced to fire-atoms, it loses nothing of its efficacy and dignity on that account. For Hobbes, consciousness itself is a property of matter and so not foreign to the world. Priestley's materialistic hypothesis does not interfere with his religious devoutness. The great prophets of Israel, who gave us our fundamental ethical and religious ideals, thought of the world, including the human soul—"the breath" of man, in material terms. With all these, matter covers the whole range of potentialities from inorganic nature to a deistic God. Tyndall could not cease to marvel at the potentialities of matter. When we should understand them, all would be clear. With this thick conception of matter, teleological idealism need not have any quarrel. Matter rises to any emergency, since the conception can be enlarged to meet the case. It would be principally a question of convenience whether we should use such a concept.

The tendency, however, has not been absent to narrow the conception of matter to the anti-teleological, or mechanical, interest, and thus to contrast matter with mind—which under such a view becomes a sort of miraculous accident. Such a conception still leaves much to admire; the body with its delicate adjustments and intricacies shows wondrous possibilities even when

contrasted with mind. Even the pale nobility of the face of a dead friend challenges our reverence by its wonderful expressiveness. The trouble with the mechanical conception is not so much its ignobility as its narrowness—its failure to take stock of all the facts, to furnish play for all the possibilities of life.

If we use matter in this narrower sense, as opposed to mind, what is the function of matter in the process of evolution? Those who have attempted to give a monistic, idealistic view of the world, in whatever form, have eventually been brought face to face with the problem of that upon which mind impinges, the non-teleological stuff against which our purposes seem to beat, and in struggling with which they discover themselves. If Plato insists that only the Good is ultimately real, and all else imitation and non-being, yet he has to recognize a reality at least in the limitations which the struggling elements of our mundane sphere set to our purposive striving. If the elements but reflect the eternal beauty, they also distort it. If Aristotle finds in matter the potential, yet it is not passively potential. It has an order of its own which may run counter to the purposive order. The Platonic dualism meets us again in Hegel's spatializing of the category of the spirit and its estrangement in its lapse to unconscious otherness. As Aristotle's potential, it meets us in Fichte's struggle of the ego with the irrational surd of our nature, while Schelling would make the physical energies merely lower categories in the history of spirit as it struggles toward its conscious awakening. Bergson would make matter the inverse of reality—the intellectual spatializing and degradation of a reality which is essentially a psychic stream of growing, blending, interpenetrating life-impulses. But, nevertheless, he has to acknowledge that it is somehow in the struggle with matter, in order to mould itself to its constitution, to maintain itself under its conditions, that life explodes like a shell into its inherent tendencies. In some sense, then, the reality of matter, as having a part in the realization of life, has had to be recognized even by those who have categorically declared its non-existence.

In giving an adequate account of mechanical matter as an external condition and instrument in the evolution of life, a pluralistic conception of the world has a decided advantage over the

monistic. It is not forced to smuggle in through the back-door what it has cast out through the front-door. It is free to follow the lead of experience in recognizing different types of reality. Among these are the physical types which, on the one hand, through their own structure and laws set definite conditions for the survival of life, and, on the other hand, furnish the intellect with the instruments by which life becomes liberated from slavery to the immediate present.

Even in dealing with the physical world, where mechanical conceptions have so long reigned supreme in our theorizing, it has become more and more clear that mechanism alone, convenient as it is within certain limits, is inadequate as a final philosophy. So far as the naturalistic aspect of the world is concerned, it would seem that the available energy must continually run down as the streams run into the sea, that heat must reach more and more a condition of equal distribution according to Carnot's law, and that the universe must eventually become stark still, or rather would have had to become so infinite ages ago. That this law has not thus operated must be due to the fact that mechanism is somehow a part of a larger constitution which is fundamentally teleological and in which life and mind are fundamental categories. Even to explain the activities of matter we find it convenient to think of it as somehow interpenetrated by intelligence; Maxwell's sorting omniscience keeps the universe from running down to a dead level.

On the other hand, I cannot feel that merely reducing the universe to metaphysical mind-stuff, as in the various types of panpsychism, necessarily ennobles life. The world is neither better nor worse for our metaphysical conceptions. And if panpsychism is indifferent to the realization of ideals, if it reduces the higher to the lower categories, if it fails to give us a preferential basis of values, if it offers no call to our creative abilities, it is teleologically indistinguishable from the crassest type of materialism. This is the logic of the fact that so many "Hegelians of the left" completely faced about from absolute idealism to absolute materialism, or rather found that the former, as impersonally conceived, was equivalent to the latter. The mere reduction of the stuff

of the universe to the type of mind-stuff is not sufficient to guarantee its value. The lowest things, as well as the highest, that we know in our experience are mental. The most degrading lusts are as much mental as the highest aspirations. Mind covers the whole range of value from heaven to hell.

The pragmatic difference in metaphysical conceptions for our ideals lies not in the stuff of our conceptions but in their friendliness to what we feel to be our higher nature, the re-enforcement of what we feel to be the best part of the universe, our ideal demands.

We must not be misled by mere words. We must recognize that pragmatically we have dynamic situations with their variations and their tendency toward types, whatever the metaphysical stuff may be. It is a mistake to suppose that by adopting more euphonious terms for these situations, such as "vital impulse" or "panpsychism," we have either explained or dignified the process. As general metaphysical entities they do not alter the problem of continuity and evolution one whit, though they may be more congenial to our imagination. The problem in any case remains for science to discover for our practical purposes of description and prediction the determining factors in the process, and for epistemology to discover the immanent categories which enable us to read the process with clearness and distinctness. We must conceive a world which makes our minds feel at home. Teleologically, it makes no difference whether we call the universe matter or spirit, if we only realize that it is such as eventually to demand and enforce ideals. This is its ultimate promise or potentiality. What name we give to reality does not matter so long as its properties, its pragmatic outcomes, are the same, so long as it can think and appreciate and furnish the object of our hopes; so long as it blossoms out into a sense for beauty, a demand for right, a worship of the ideal. It is true in any case that the universe makes us for itself, to express itself.

Our direct acquaintance with the effectiveness of form is limited to the operation of mind and to this in its higher ideal striving. When we try to imagine formal selection in the universe at large, it is at any rate easier to picture such selection to ourselves if we think of a greater and better mind interpenetrating the various

stages of the process with intelligent interest, re-enforcing the formal demands of the process and eliminating failures.

Even if the conception of an abstract, immanent form should satisfy our purely logical and aesthetic demands upon the universe, our ethical and religious needs would still call for an interpenetrating and overarching personal constitution which works for righteousness and beauty, which is sympathetically concerned in ideal realization, which in short makes warm and living the formal constitution of the process. We think of God as the master-mind, interpenetrating our minds and nature and, in a manner which we can but faintly grasp, guiding to a meaningful issue.

To be omnipresent and universally effective, this mind need not be the whole of things. Heat and gravitation are present throughout the physical world, but they are not the whole of the world. Take social history,—a great personality like Jesus may permeate history and make it converge toward him, may stamp and control history, and yet not be all of history.

Of this larger regulative and compensating universal constitution it must indeed seem that it does a wholesale rather than a retail business. This would indeed be deadening to our ethical and religious consciousness, except for the other analogy derived from our own organic economy, namely, that the regular adjustments become automatically purposive. So the wholesale operations of the universe require no attention. Maxwell's sorting demon can do his work automatically. Mechanism can take over the work of intelligence. It is only the retail unique relations which require interest. This leaves mind, in its higher reaches, free to deal with the rarer personal aspects of the situation, the spots where, by virtue of spontaneity and complexity, free and rational creativeness operates. And if even here personal interest or sympathy seems appalling, we must remember that the mind of minds is not bounded by our narrow limitations of space and time, but is capable of an infinitely larger field of interest. We may also imagine that the occasions for sharing in this larger life lie in us—this supra-finite life lying ever at our subliminal or supra-liminal door, ever interpenetrating and overlapping as gravitation overlaps, ever waiting, and ever welcoming, the proper organization and due awakening in us for its powers to be realized, as

light awaits the organization of an eye for its beauty of color to appear. Thus pluralism, and pluralism alone, with its conception of growth and organization of centres and their mutual and cosmic interpenetration, fills the need of the religious demands of life.

As, moreover, our finite minds can interpenetrate and mould various types of stuff into the unity of ideals, so the master-mind may interpenetrate the variety of the processes of nature, even though they are not mind. The statue can express ideals even if it is not mind-stuff. We may thus have teleological unity with variety of stuff and stages of development. We may in closing adopt the language of Emerson, even though we must conceive our relation to the Master-mind as more concrete and intimate than that implied in the Oversoul: "We live in succession, in division, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole, the wise silence, the universal beauty to which every part and particle is related, the eternal one."

*THE RELATION OF PLATO TO OUR AGE AND
TO THE AGES*

GEORGE ROWLAND DODSON


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A few great books, for those who know them well, make unnecessary a countless number of lesser books. From the higher point of view, all can be seen that is visible from the lower, and much more. To have carefully studied the works of one of the world's great men is to have immensely widened one's own life. To comprehend the scope of his thought and the variety and extent of his sympathies is to have an essential element of a liberal education. An enthusiastic and indiscriminating discipleship, at least at first, is not to be deplored, for a realization of the limitations of great men and the incompleteness of all systems is sure to come later; but no one understands any view of the world who has never been able to feel its plausibility. There is no delight in life like the companionship of a noble mind. A long comradeship with a great man, one in whom intellectual power, ethical elevation, all-inclusive sympathies, and wholeness and wholeness of view are united, is one of the greatest of our human privileges. To it we turn for consolation in our sorrows, for a refuge from the petty irritations and vexations that so constantly beset us, and for help to rise above them to serenity and peace. Through these great souls we are able in some measure to realize the Emersonian ideal of a life of activity and at the same time of poise and power, the hands being in the world of action while the head is above the storm. No service is more real or precious than that which such men have rendered to humanity. By living on the higher planes, they appeal to our latent instincts; they help us to understand our own best selves, and to be what without them we could never be.

Of those who have served our race in this way one of the greatest is Plato. To speak of his mind, of its sweep and power, so

vast and with such insight that, as Lutoslawski well says, he summed up all that went before him and anticipated most of what has come after him, is happily unnecessary. His name is almost synonymous with intelligence. But, more than any of his successors, he is able to minister to one of our peculiar needs. He saw life sanely, and he saw it whole. This wholeness of view is something that, in the increasing complexity of life, the division of labor, the growth of knowledge and the specialization of research, we are constantly in danger of losing. And because we do so often lose it we ourselves become lost in the wilderness of the civilized world. Of course, it was easier for Plato than it is for us. The sum total of science, of philosophical and historical knowledge, in his time was so limited that it was possible for a mind of his order to master it all. He saw everything in relation to everything else. His was pre-eminently the synoptic mind. We feel, as we read his pages, that he is thinking in the light of all the great human interests and forgetting none. For this reason he is one of the wisest of men. Despite the archaisms and the elements that are peculiarly Greek, which make us aware that he lived in the fourth century before Christ, he still impresses us as one of the most universal and human of men. He did, indeed, belong to his age, but still more is he a citizen and contemporary of all ages.

Marvellous as were his intellectual powers, he was equally great in his life. In him the moral and religious interests were supreme. A consummate artist himself, a master, almost a magician, in literary art, the soul of beauty-worshipping Greece incarnate in him, his judgments of the epic and dramatic poetry and the music of his day had almost a Puritan harshness. There is even a suggestion of the attitude of Tolstoy. This is simply the consequence of the strength of his moral sentiment. The great question, he tells us in the *Republic*, is whether we shall be good or bad. To this all else is subordinate—art, literature, industry and politics, everything in public and private life. Surpassingly great thinkers as he and Aristotle both were, they are nevertheless to be regarded as primarily spokesmen of the moral consciousness, and their philosophy—for it is substantially one—is a moral philosophy. Their books are our moral classics. When



asked recently to name some books that would be useful to American citizens who desire to rear their children wisely and well, I was somewhat startled to find that I was placing Plato's Dialogues and Aristotle's Ethics among the first on the list. To be sure, these wonderful writings need to be supplemented, but they have given classic statement to some of the most essential elements in our composite moral ideal. It was some comfort in this situation to remember that President Eliot once said that Plato's statement of the theory of education has never been surpassed. One is tempted to quote many passages to confirm this estimate of the value of Plato's moral teaching. Consider, for example, the following page from the Republic:

But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from the earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.

There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly

blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.

We have here a perfectly clear and adequate presentation of certain fundamental principles that we must observe in the moral education of our children, and that the public must somehow apply in such living questions as the censorship of art, the supervision of moving-picture shows, and other forms of commercial amusement. Aristotle states the rule more tersely thus: The young must be so educated that the good will seem natural and the bad strange. President G. S. Hall only puts the same truth in a different way when he says:

The will especially is a trust we are to administer for the child, not as he may now wish, but as he will wish when more mature. We must now compel what he will later wish to compel himself to do. To find his habits already formed to the same laws that his mature will and the world later enjoin cements the strongest of all bonds between mentor and child. . . . Everything in conduct should be mechanized as early and completely as possible. The child's notion of what is right is what is habitual, and the simple, to which all else is reduced in thought, is identified with the familiar. It is this primitive stratum of habits which principally determines our deepest beliefs—which all must have over and above knowledge—to which men revert in mature years from youthful vagaries.

Plato's writings are among the very best material for moral education, for the reason that in them the highest thought is blended with the noblest emotion. Many of our ethical works are the expressions merely of the critical faculty. All feeling, all enthusiasm, is carefully avoided. If you have a moral life, such a book as Sidgwick's, for example, may help you to understand it. But although it is a treatise on ethics, it is not ethical in the sense of stimulating and strengthening the nobler nature, and is not meant to be. Such works as this have their value, even though it be small. The reader of Plato, on the other hand, not only is instructed, but he feels the contagion of the philosopher's enthusiasms for truth, beauty, and goodness. He realizes that in his own experience he is verifying the principle on which

Plato lays so much stress, that he who associates with good men is transformed into their likeness, and that good men who worship the ideal become like unto God, while the greatest penalty of wrong-doing is that one is thrown into the company of evil men and is inevitably conformed to their image. In the Platonic Dialogues there is neither pure ethical theorizing, which can make no man better, nor exhortation, which is equally futile and is usually and rightfully resented, nor the two together, which is not any more effective. What we have is the expression of a great life which is wholly present in all that it does. The intelligence is not the less vigorous and clear because it works in the atmosphere of moral and aesthetic enthusiasms and of religious faith in the Idea of Good as the source of all things. We have yet to learn that our separation of the functions of life is justifiable only when it is merely provisional and temporary, and that we mutilate ourselves unless we can recombine them in the unity of a concrete life and be whole and human once more. Even logic, which seems necessarily abstract, can, in my opinion, best be taught by more concrete methods. What a magnificent intellectual discipline, for instance, it would be for young men and women to read Plato's Republic critically, to follow the course of the argument in the various books with the object of determining its validity and cogency, and of seeing just where and in what respects it breaks down, and how it would have to be restated or modified or supplemented in order to be logically acceptable! But the moral influence of this book is still greater, especially if read in the impressionable years of early manhood and womanhood, when the mind is still forming and noble enthusiasms have not been rendered impossible by a too intimate acquaintance with the men and the literature of the cynical spirit. For these wonderful pages express not only great thoughts but a passionate love for the supreme human ideal, namely, that of a richly endowed nature brought to its highest perfection by education and using all its powers in the service of society.

To be sure, superficial readers will probably miss this fact; but then superficial readers of great books never derive much profit from their activity. They find that Plato's ideal is a philosopher, and since this term today suggests an epistemologist,

or logician, or a dealer in unintelligibilities about the Absolute, they suppose that this is what the Republic would have us all to be. Whereas what Plato means by the philosophic nature is, as Nettleship so well says, "simply the ideally good nature; human nature completely gifted and with free play given to all its gifts. The philosophic element in man is the essentially human element; it is what makes a man a man, and therefore in its fulness implies a perfect humanity." It is that in us which is akin to the divine, which is of the same nature as the truth we seek, as the ideal we worship.

Plato lays great stress on the first syllable of the word "philosopher." There are, he says, those who have ambitions, who love place and fame; others care more for wealth; some like to use their hands, and some are seekers after new sensations. Man is fundamentally and always a lover. The philosopher is no exception: he is a "lover of the vision of truth." He is dominated by the impulse to understand and be at one with the world, and his chief characteristic is a divine love and longing which will carry him to the utmost development possible to man. He becomes, in Emerson's phrase, "a lover of the uncontained and immortal beauty." Thus, as one of Plato's best interpreters remarks, we have here the Greek analogue of the New Testament conception of the charity, or love, which is the central source and vivifying power in all the virtues, that which "beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." "In this conception of philosophy there are combined the scientific spirit and the religious spirit in their highest forms. It is the desire to be at one with the laws of nature, and to live according to nature; and as to Plato the world is emphatically the work of a divine intelligence, being at one with nature is also in a sense being at one with God. This is why he speaks of such understanding in terms which we should apply to religious emotion."

This ideal union of the highest intellectual activity with the spirit of worship is perhaps best expressed in those two pages of the Symposium which sketch the normal course of love from its humble beginnings of attraction to the individual and physical to the perception and adoration of that which is beautiful in all beauty, good in all goodness, and true in all truth. It is sad to

think how this passage has been misunderstood, and what perverted meanings are given to the term "Platonic love." For, however curious the language may be, what Plato is attempting to describe, or rather to indicate, is the moral experience of all lives that attain to a high stage of development. Love, in its beginnings, is desperately unideal and matter-of-fact. There seems to be no romance in the sex-attraction of animals and savages. In higher stages of evolution, men realize in experience the capacity of love for transformation and spiritualization. Countless husbands and wives have found their natural affection deepening and being sublimated until it becomes a divine radiance shed over the whole of life. That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; nevertheless there is some spiritual from the beginning and some natural to the end. From idol to ideal—this is the distance we traverse in the development of love. We have only to keep love growing to find at last that it is transformed into worship. All the actual beauty we see in the lives about us becomes a hint of the perfect beauty, and the good in those who are dearest to us is a suggestion, or partial revelation, of the ideal goodness which alone we can adore. And not only do we come in time to realize what it is that we admire and love in one another and are inspired by in the great and good, but we also sometimes understand—and are kept modest by the thought—that those who love us really love the ideals which they believe us to embody. And we dare not take this love to ourselves, so far as we have not the qualities ascribed to us in the affectionate admiration of our friends.

Nothing can make this truth clear to him whose experience has not prepared him to understand it, and no paraphrase of Plato's wonderful pages can give the glow of the philosopher's enthusiasm for the great idea. He felt deeply that it is not man's destiny to remain absorbed in an individual attachment and entranced by personal beauty; but that, rising above the undiscerning loves of the slave, he should perceive that all beauty is of one family, that "the true order of love is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, thence to fair practices, to fair notions, until at last,

with the eye of the mind, he beholds absolute beauty, simple and divine, in the contemplation of which it is man's highest privilege to live." For Plato, as for Dante, the supreme delight was that blend of thought and emotion on the summit of life, the contemplation of the beatific vision, the worship of the ideal. He saw that our life essentially consists in a struggle for perfection, and that it therefore rests on ideal foundations. The best interpreter of his meaning is not any pedantic commentator, but a life of thought and love. The creator of beautiful things feels that he draws near to reality in proportion as he succeeds in portraying the ideal of loveliness; the seeker for truth is convinced that his mind perceives the real in so far as it thinks the true; and to those who hunger and thirst after righteousness everything is unreal compared to that toward which they strive. Always do the active imagination, the growing mind, and the pure and loving heart, see God, and in the worship of that ideal of perfect beauty, righteousness, and love, find their true life.

In Plato it is the whole man that philosophizes. This is one of the great sources of his power. His aesthetic, moral, social, and religious interests, and his passionate intellectual ardor do not impair his critical faculties. Indeed, one is most critical in the things that one loves. And the fact that he is so well balanced, and that every question is examined in the light of all the great human interests, saves him from the mistakes of doctrinaires. He does make mistakes, but he has too vivid a sense of the enormous number of impulses, instincts, needs, and longings in our nature to commit the folly of erecting a theory on such an abstraction as the idea of an "economic man," or that cold calculator of pleasures and pains which some have had in mind when constructing ethical systems and interpretations of history.

It is perfectly true that in strictly scientific investigation we must denude ourselves of all interests except that of discovering facts and laws; but when we are dealing with human life a complete endowment of healthy instincts is as necessary as intellectual clearness and power. Plato succeeded in the main thing. His was a nature as harmonious as it was rich and complete. He closely approximated his own dream of perfection, namely, health of soul. His ideal is, therefore, wholesome, and all the ages may

safely follow. Where he failed was in the means he sometimes recommended for its realization, as in his proposals in regard to family life. But even here, it must be remembered, only the small governing class was to be subject to arbitrary regulation, the mass of the people presumably being left to the customs which have the approval of centuries. Furthermore, the family life which he knew and was willing to surrender for the good of the state was not that which Christian ideals and Teutonic chivalry have combined to produce, but something far less noble and beautiful.

One of Plato's greatest services to his age and to the ages is through the conception he has given us of the good life. He regards the moral life as a problem in organization, which it essentially and normally is, and not as a fight, which badly born and unhappily situated natures find it to be for themselves, and which, generalizing from their own case, they suppose it must be for all. For Plato, the good life is the life that is set in order. There is a natural scale of values for all the many instincts, impulses, needs, tendencies, desires, and aspirations of human nature. None of these is bad, when in its subordinate and proper place. All are good when functioning normally in an organized life. The highest in man is reason, intelligence, together with the corresponding desire to use this power. Next is a group of nobler emotions, for which in English we have no adequate collective term. It includes that which makes men worthily ambitious, which gives them a sense of honor, and makes them capable of moral indignation at injustice and wrong. Lower still is a heterogeneous mass of desires, all useful and indispensable, but difficult to control, and frequently strong enough to throw the whole nature into disorder. These are the raw materials of the moral life. Our supreme task is to organize them, not out of enmity to any, but from regard to all. The ideal is *fulness of life through order*. When the hierarchy of impulse has been established, and the life, so to speak, has been graded, the result is such happiness as is possible to our nature. It is health of soul. This is the answer to the great question which Glaucon and Adeimantus put to Socrates at the beginning of the Second Book of the Republic. We want to know, they say in substance, what the good life essentially is.

Please do not tell us about the way it is rewarded in heaven or on earth. Suppose it did not pay in terms of external prosperity, suppose even that it brought suffering, what is the good life in itself? The reply is that the good life is the life which, through education and citizenship in a well-ordered state, is itself set in order, with the highest and divinest in our nature in control and everything else in its appropriate place. After sketching an ideal human career in which the soul rises to the greatest height, he outlines the reverse process of utter ruin through progressive disorganization.

There is one passage in which Plato, concisely and with entire clearness and adequacy, sets forth his conception of the good life, and which I always want to quote in every ethical discussion. He says:

In reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others; he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance. (Republic, 448, D-E.)

Observe here the apparently parenthetical but important words, "the intermediate intervals." Plato knows that his statement is merely schematic, and that he has not given a complete list of the impulses in our nature which it is our life task to organize. We must, he says, find for each power, or "part," of the soul its proper position in the structure of life.

The social problem is practically the same. He knows that men

differ, and that individuality implies organization. So he aims to utilize the fighting instinct, the artistic instinct, and the powers of the thinkers. His great problem is to prevent the waste of human resources, especially the highest. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. He strives for a form of social organization in which each member should render to society the particular service he could perform best. Each man would then have an organic place in human society. And as the danger to the individual moral life is from insubordinate impulse, so the structure of society is menaced by "the inorganic man."

This way of viewing the moral and social life is not antiquated, but something that we are now growing into and that will be more and more indispensable to our highest development. The comprehending student of our time realizes that one of our most urgent needs is that of a revised conception of goodness. The traditional conception is too narrow, too ascetic, and—I will not say, too Christian, but—too Pauline. The moral life is regarded as a fight between two parts of our nature, the flesh and the spirit; and the ideal, as stated in the letter to the Romans, is not to control the life of impulse but to destroy it. Mortify the deeds of the flesh. The aim is to kill one part of the self, and for the other part to live in mystic union with a divine spirit. Of course, there is something to be said for this view, and for those whose passions are so strong that they are constantly in danger of being swept away by them, it is perhaps the most practicable as well as the most natural view. If one is beset by devils, he must fight for his life. As the gospel says, "If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: for it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell." To be sure, if one is so badly born as that, he has no other resource. But normal, ordinary people have no such difficulties with their eyes or other members as this. In the complexity of modern life, and with so many factors to consider in each concrete case, it is for most people harder to know what is right than, when it is known, to do it. Paul, struggling and praying to be delivered from his "body of death," is exceptional. He is not a type. We may praise him, but we are misled by him if we fall into his way of thinking of the good life as a fight. The Platonic conception of our moral task as consisting essentially, not

in an internecine civil war in our members, but in an intelligent organization of the many elements of our richly endowed nature, is much more rational and wholesome. The ideal life is the abundant life, the abundance being attained through the establishment of inner order. Ideal goodness is simply the amplest expression of human nature.

It is no disloyalty to our Christian inheritance to acknowledge this fact. In the New Testament are teachings that are as the purest gold. That God is best symbolized by such terms as light and love; that evil is to be overcome, not by evil, but by good; that faith, hope, and love are the essential and the ultimate in religion; that we are children of the Perfect—these are truths that humanity must steer by for ages to come. We do not need to give them up when we follow Plato rather than Paul in our ideas of the moral life. All the true things, the beautiful and the good, are compatible, for they are of one family. And the Platonic view is not only truer to the experience of twentieth century Americans than the militant and ascetic view with which we are so familiar, but it is more in accord with the general conception we are coming to have of civilization. The old times, when men had to fight for their lives against savage beasts and still more savage men, are passing. More and more the life of civilized men is actually becoming a vast co-operative, constructive activity. We are being knit together in a tissue of relations of many kinds. Everywhere the call is for builders, not for destroyers; it is for those who can conciliate and direct, for those who can unite and organize men.

There is just one great defect in the Platonic ethics, and that is remediable. The main conception is fundamentally true and is clearly and adequately stated: still it is pre-evolutionary and consequently too static. We have come to think of life in terms of growth. It is a process, and while the elements that enter into it must be organized, the organization cannot be effected once for all. Nothing can be done once for all. Life means adjustments and unceasing readjustments. Since it is a process of development, good is that which promotes development, bad is that which hinders it. These two great ideas, that of organization and that of evolution, are complementary. Taken together, they

round out ethical philosophy. From this point of view, the ideally good life is the life that is set in order, but one whose organization is plastic and capable of constant adjustment in a world whose law is change.

An important corollary is to be noted. If our life task, personal and social, is fundamentally one of organization, then those who think of it as primarily a fight are behind the times. And if life is an evolutionary process, men of revolutionary spirit and methods are anachronisms. Furthermore, it follows that those who are militant revolutionists are doubly wrong, social misfits, reactionary and dangerous. The moral crusader, passionate in his hatreds and seeking to bring the kingdom of God by attacking somebody, belongs to the past. The social life of the future is to be directed by men of a more statesman-like type, men who are constructive in spirit and evolutionary in method.

The main defect of Plato's thought about human life is that it is pre-evolutionary. It is true that in a passage in the *Laws* he remarks that time is the maker of states—time and natural process; that "the change was not made all in a moment, but, little by little, during a very long period of time, the world came to be what the world is." Still, he cherishes the impossible ideal of finding the best institutions and laws and fixing them forever. Moreover, he does not realize, as many do not today, the danger of paternalism; he has not perceived that it is better for men to govern themselves than to be directed by a superior class. They do not manage things so well, but they are educated and developed by the difficulties and responsibilities of self-government. The reader of the *Republic* must, therefore, remember that Plato's description of the evolution of the state and his picture of the progressive disorganization of the state and the analogous process of ruin in the soul are to be taken in a logical rather than in an historical sense. He takes up certain tendencies in human life and shows what they ultimately come to, if unchecked. A New Testament writer practically does the same thing, when he says, "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." That is the logical goal of hate, its meaning and its direction from the beginning.

The problem of inculcating reverence in the young is often

treated in the Dialogues, and the discussions have a strangely modern sound. Plato faced the fact that the youth of his time were familiarized from their earliest years with Homer and Hesiod. This is magnificent poetry, which tells stories in the most fascinating way, and is well adapted to shape the admirations of impressionable children. Unfortunately, the stories were not always models of virtuous thoughts, and some of the tales about the gods are objectionable, the result being to confuse the moral judgments of the Greek race.

And since not reverence, but a discriminating reverence, is a prime need, Plato is driven to demand an expurgated scripture and a censorship of fiction. "God and the things of God," he says, "surely are perfect in every way," and the poets are not to be permitted to teach otherwise, for always do men tend to become like that which they worship. And to that question of perennial interest, How shall children be taught reverence for others? Plato gives the one answer that is valid for all time. It is found in a passage in the Laws which ought to be graven in the mind of all parents and teachers:

Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence. We indeed fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice.

Is it not strange that, although this was said so clearly and forcibly nearly 2,300 years ago, there are still people who imagine that reverence can be taught by precept, that it can be inculcated in children by criticising them for not having it? Would that twentieth-century Americans might learn from Plato that the way to teach reverence is to have it, to respect the personality of

children, to show to their own elders the beautiful deference and courtesy they wish their children to have, and to avoid the cynical and scoffing spirit as they would the plague.

If inspired writings are those which inspire us, the Platonic Dialogues constitute one of the most precious parts of the Bible of our race. They find us in the heights and in the depths of our nature, and appeal to every high instinct in our human endowment. When we feel dull and discouraged, when we have slipped down from the heights on which we wish to live, we have only to open these delightful books to find refreshment of spirit and renewing of mind. There is the *Gorgias*, which distinguishes the pleasant from the good and is a dramatic portrayal of the true and noble art of life. The immoralism of Nietzsche is here clearly stated and refuted 2,200 years before Nietzsche. As we gaze on Plato's idealization of suffering goodness, our hearts leap within us, and we realize once more in our experience the truth which the author of the Fourth Gospel had in mind when he makes his ideal Christ exclaim, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." The moral passion of Plato thrills us as he argues in support of the four great convictions:

1. It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.
2. It is better to suffer for wrong-doing than not to suffer.
3. We do not what we will, but what we wish.
4. To be and not to seem is the end of life.

The *Protagoras*, too, is a nearly perfect work of art, and doubtless contains reminiscences of some of the finest talk on our planet. In it are found the memorable words: "No one punishes the evil-doer under the notion or for the reason that he has done wrong—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished and the man who sees him punished may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention."

In the *Protagoras* Plato defends his beautiful faith in human nature—a faith which increasing knowledge justifies—that "no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature."

There has never been better preaching in the world, nor any less wearisome. Plato mingles humor and satire with moral earnestness as he expresses his life's exalted and beautiful ideal. Nothing can be more dramatic, for example, than the situations in the *Apology* and *Crito*, when Socrates is made to utter such convictions as these: "No evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death."—"The unexamined life is not worth living."—"Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued."—"We ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him."

In the *Phaedo* Plato treats of the problem of immortality. There are many verbal fallacies in it which are natural in the infancy of logic; yet, as Jowett says, "the arguments, taken in the spirit, and not in the letter, are our arguments." But this dialogue is more than a book of philosophy; it is also a work of art, in which scenes of suffering and death are clothed with beauty. A spirit of fine, sweet humanity pervades it, the contagion of which is like a precious perfume. Recall the crisis in the conversation, when the argument which Socrates had builded seemed to be overthrown by the objections of Simmias and Cebes. *Phaedo* remarks that the company was dejected, and for the moment had not only lost confidence in the discredited argument, but despaired of any more trustworthy reasoning in the future. Socrates, seated in the midst of the young men, stroking the head of *Phaedo*, soothed their disappointment, rallied them as a general rallies his defeated troops, and proceeded to rehabilitate the argument. But first he warned them against the danger of generalizing from such an experience. For just as a betrayal of confidence sometimes produces loss of faith in human nature, so the breakdown of an argument sometimes makes them despair of the possibility of knowledge. We must beware, said he, of "becoming misologists: no worse thing can happen to a man than this." This counsel is still needed; and I have never ceased to be grateful to a great Harvard teacher who twenty years ago told me that in my intellectual adventures I need never fear so long as I kept "faith in the worth of human nature and the reality of truth."

There is not, in my opinion, much of value in Pragmatism,

but what there is, as well as the sphere in which it is useful, was indicated in the brave words of Simmias in the *Phaedo*:

I feel myself—and I daresay that you have the same feeling—how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him.

The intellectual enthusiasm of the Greek race, an enthusiasm which Plato and Aristotle are still propagating by contagion in their readers, is naïvely expressed in these sentences from the *Phaedrus*: “There neither is nor ever will be anything more honored in the eyes both of gods and men than the cultivation of the mind,” and “For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse?” Hundreds of these gems, or golden texts, are scattered through these wonderful pages. Even in the *Timaeus*, in which absurdities are mingled with insights, we find the statement that “he who neglects education, walks lame to the end of life, and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below.” The *Timaeus* also reaches the conception of the ethical life as under law, as a voluntary taking of one’s place in the order of the universe. Plato’s final conclusions on the great ethical problem of the place of pleasure in life are given in the *Philebus*, the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* marking transitional stages of his thought. What he calls the “loveliest of lives” is, he says, not simple, but a mixture, a blend, first of measure, of beauty, symmetry and truth, then of mind and wisdom, of the sciences and the arts, and finally, in the fifth class, the pure and necessary pleasures, that is, those which accompany temperance and health. The *Philebus* is a solid ethical work, in which a serious attempt is made to find the proper place for the leading interests in life. It is almost modern in its technical

thoroughness and difficulty for the reader, but the ardent lover of the highest things still reveals, here and there, the feeling that accompanies his thought, as when he speaks of "the soul's power and faculty of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth."

The master work is, of course, the *Republic*. To praise it is like complimenting the stars or the moral law. What it is to those who know it best may perhaps be indicated by saying that, if they were to be banished from civilized society and allowed to take with them but one book, they would not hesitate long; they would take the *Republic*. For one of the greatest of earth's children has here discussed the most central of all problems—how to live best, and what is the form of human society in which the best life is possible. Here is a picture of the rise of the human soul through education to its greatest possible heights and of its ruin through progressive disorganization. It is at once philosophy, poetry, and preaching. It is a dramatic writing in which ideas are exhibited alive and growing, and truth is elicited by contact of view with view. His faith in education is as strong as ours, but his ideal is higher than that which most men cherish. He urged athletics that the body might be brought to its perfection; he prescribed music, including literature and the arts, in order that the young might be led to develop a true taste and an overmastering love of the beautiful in all things, not excepting conduct and life; and he considered that the object of scientific study was to produce statesman-like, synoptic minds, growing ever in the love of truth and the power to see the good, the consummate product of education being a life of "reason blended with music."

Plato's thoughts and ideals were no doubt timely in the fourth century before Christ, but they are not less timely in the twentieth century after. Great, rich, prosperous America needs his enthusiasm for the ideal not less than the Athens of his day. What would be the result for our modern society of an acceptance of the ideals of the Greek moral philosophers? Bosanquet, speaking of Aristotle, whose ideals in the large are the same as Plato's, concisely and happily answers:

The habituation of the young and the moral education of society are to be so guided and framed by the statesman that art and learning and religion shall always hold the highest place and so far as humanly possible shall have the lead in, and form the inspiration of, his country. . . . All persons are capable of religion and knowledge, and the tone and worthiness of their life is very different according as they are or are not, in their degree, conscious of an inspiration and an ideal pervading their society. . . . We have to think of the tone of a society in which saintliness and intelligence and science or, again, fine art and poetry, are respected, compared with one in which all things of that kind go to the wall. The two are different, not merely in including a few individuals of different types, but in the whole mind and spirit of every person, right down to the simplest and least fortunate citizens.

This last point is very important. The highest culture ought not to be the exclusive privilege of a few; it is rather the chief means of human happiness. Our democracy does not adequately realize this, but clings to the conviction that a man's life consists in the abundance of things which he possesses. But our human life is primarily social, and our happiness must be largely in one another. And we must learn that it is impossible to derive much happiness from association with lives which have no care for what gives worth to life. Society, in the true sense, is possible only to men and women with ideals. As Bosanquet puts it: "The highest form of human association is that in which human beings have come to care for that in each other which is the best and consequently the most real thing in them, namely, the highest goodness and intelligence. When this is so, the group-consciousness has become the consciousness of a response in the other to what is highest and best in the self. This response is a heightening of life by the extension of the awareness of our life to the life of the friend who shares our consciousness of the best things. We feel our life intensified in his."

One who has not studied Plato, but who has an inaccurate and exaggerated notion of progress, may feel that the readers of these old books are carried away by their enthusiasm, and that what they say of the great teacher cannot be true. But if the critic will read for himself, he will realize that, as Emerson said of the Yosemite Valley, "the facts are up to the brag." The feeling

is natural, however, for those who know Plato best are often astonished at the grasp of his mind and his anticipation of the best thought of today. For example, in the *Charmides*, Socrates remarks that, when a man comes to a physician to be treated for bad eyes, an inquiry is made into his general health. The Greek physicians knew better than to attempt to treat one organ while ignoring the body of which it is an organic part; and the *Phaedrus* quotes a saying of Hippocrates, that "the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole." In the *Charmides* Socrates then continues, "the Greek physicians are quite right as far as they go"; but they should go farther, for "as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this is the reason why the cure of so many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well." Apropos of the physicians, he remarks that in his day they were ingenious in finding "very strange and new-fangled names for diseases, and had also found out a way of torturing the world, namely, by the invention of lingering death." Indeed, the humor of the philosopher gives life and interest to many of his pages. He can laugh even with those who laugh at the idealist, and reports the jest of the Thracian handmaid about the philosopher Thales who was looking at the stars and fell in a well. She said, "He was so eager to know what was going on in heaven that he could not see what was before his feet." And in the allegory of the cave he makes us realize that it was in Greece as it is with us—the practical politicians ridicule the idealistic struggler for the world's betterment. They smile as he indulges in what they consider impotent talk; for do they not carry the primaries?

All this Plato sees, but he also knows that there is a point of view from which the little, sordid mind is itself ridiculous:

When he [the idealist] draws the other into the upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of gov-

ernment and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he, being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every one who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two characters: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in liberty and leisure—him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavoring a sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven. (*Theaetetus*, 175.)

Plato's thought and ideals are not dead, but alive still and fertilizing the minds of men. Being the very incarnation of the more permanent aspirations of mankind, of our inborn yearning for perfection, he has in all the ages since he disappeared into the unseen been an uplifting influence on the world's higher life. The theologians and Church Fathers, the great poets, the social idealists, groups of scholars such as the Cambridge Platonists, and practically all significant thinkers of the present time, have been profoundly influenced by Plato directly or through others who have learned from him, and usually in both ways. Open any serious modern work on philosophy, ethics, or religion, and in the index at the end you are almost sure to find a number of references to this great name. Professor J. S. Harrison has shown in his book, "*The Teachers of Emerson*," that Greek thought was the most important factor in Emerson's intellectual development, Plato and the Platonists being the feeding-ground of his mind. This is not a theory, but a demonstration, for "it was Emerson's habit to index his books and to mark the places which held his attention," and, when these marked passages are "studied in the light of his critical attitude toward Platonism, they appear as veritable sources of his thought." We thus learn that the Platonists inspired Emerson as he inspires us, and those who love

both Plato and Emerson love the same thing. We get, thus, a new sense of the fact that the great intellectual and spiritual traditions of civilization are the bread of life for mankind.

The chief difficulty in writing on this subject is to come to an end. There can be no question of adequate treatment of this great philosopher and great man, who has dealt with and illuminated all the main interests of our race from athletics to eugenics and religion. If we must try to sum up in sentence the chief service of Plato to our age and the ages, we perhaps cannot do better than to say that from him and from those whom he has inspired and taught we have best learned to perform our civic and social duties and yet live in the ideal realm, to have our conversation in heaven as we walk the streets of our earthly city.



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